Израильская нефтянная ситуация на конец 70х годов

#1
Рассекреченные документы из американских архивов

ntelligence cable regarding the situation in the Middle East. Topics include: Arab-Israeli crisis; Iranian sale of oil to Israel; U.S.-Syrian relations. Cable. Central Intelligence Agency. OMITTED. Issue Date: Jun 8, 1967. Date Declassified: Sep 23, 1994. Sanitized. Complete. 2 page(s).



DLS22 9
PP YEKADS
DE YEKADL 6682R 1592040
ZKZK PP ZSL DE
P 082035Z
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
CNO (0P922Y)
AFSSO USAF
DIA/ISIC
NIC
STATE (RCI)
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION
JCS
SSO ACSI DA
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER
CIA-OCI
ZEM
(ADVANCE)
COUNTRY IRAN/USSR/ARAB STATES/ISRAEL
DOI 4 JUNE 1967
SUBJECT COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT
ARAB/ISRAELI CRISIS AND IRANIAN/ISRAELI RELATIONS
ACQ
SOURCE

1.

2. THE SOVIET UNION IS WELL AWARE THAT THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE BEEN PLOTTING FOR SOME TIME
TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT SYRIAN REGIME, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE SYRIA HAS
INTENSIFIED PRESSURE AGAINST WESTERN OIL COMPANIES. SINCE THE U.S.
IS IN NO POSITION TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN SYRIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
IT HAS RESORTED TO INDIRECT ACTION AGAINST SYRIA. THE
SOVIETS ALSO KNEW THAT THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS PLANNING
A COUP ON EGYPT AND SYRIA SIMILAR TO ONE IT ENGINEERED IN GREECE,
AND THE SOVIETS PLANNED TO PREVENT IT.

3. SINCE THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS HAS NOW DEVELOPED FROM A
LOCAL INTO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, IT WILL HAVE TO BE
SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE U.S. AND THE USSR.
THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, INTENDS TO HONOR ITS
PROMISE TO SUPPORT THE ARAB STATES. COMMUNIST CHINA,
HAS PLAYED ONLY A PROPAGANDA ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARAB STATES.

184
RECEIVED
WHCA
1967 JUN 8 21 47
1.3(a)(4)
1.3(a)(4)(5)
1.3(a)(4)(5)
1.3(a)(4)(5)
1.3(a)(4)(5)
1.3(a)(4)(5)
SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-385
By NARA, Date 9-23-94
[Illegible text]
4. UNFORTUNATELY, CONTRARY TO IRAN'S CLAIM
THAT IT DOES NOT SELL OIL TO ISRAEL, ITAN HELPS ISRAEL NOT ONLY WITH
OIL BUT ALSO MILITARILY. SEVERAL ISRAELI SPECIALISTS ARE IN IRAN
NOW, JUST FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE
IRANIAN MILITARY. THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO COOPERATE CLOSELY
WITH THE HUGH AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP ON IRAN. THIS NOT ONLY
AROUSES THE ANGER OF THE ARAB STATES, BUT ALSO EVOKES
"SORROW AND DISAPPOINTMENT OF ALL THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND LOVERS
OF WORLD PEACE." THE SOVIETS WILL PROTEST TO
IRAN IF THEY SEE THAT IRAN PLANS TO CONTINUE ITS AID TO ISRAEL AND
ITS PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE ARABS.

5. DISSEM: CINCMEAFSA CINCUSNAVEUR CINSOUTH (PERSONAL)
EUCOM

570

NNNN

1.3(a)(4)(5)
1.3(a)(4)(5)
1.3(a)(4)
COPY LBJ LIBRARY
 
#2
MEMORANDUM

0043

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 3, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: U.S. Commitment to Israel on Oil
Supplies (U)

As part of the Sinai II commitments, we agreed that if Israel
is unable to meet its oil needs through normal arrangement,
we would be prepared, upon notification by Israel, to proceed
as follows for a period of at least five years: (C)

-- If the U.S. is not under supply restrictions, we will
"promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel" to meet
all of their normal requirements. We will also make "every
effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport."

-- If the U.S. is under supply restrictions, the U.S.
will follow the IEA allocation and conservation formula in
helping Israel meet essential requirements. (Israel would be
expected to cut back consumption somewhat). (C)

-- The U.S. will include in its annual aid to Israel some
funds to help offset the costs of oil imports and to build oil
stocks. (C)

Talking Points (U)

-- We remain committed under Sinai II to help Israel meet
her oil needs in the event of supply disruptions. We have
recently reaffirmed this commitment at the highest level. If
Iran declines to sell oil to Israel, we are prepared to come
to Israel's assistance if necessary. (C)

-- Israel has not yet experienced serious supply disruptions.
(Normally Israel gets about 70% of her oil from Iran,
but has thus far been able to buy substitute oil on the spot
market. Israel's daily needs are a bit under 150,000 barrels). (C)

-- Even after Israeli withdrawal from the Gulf of Suez oil field
(which now produces about 20,000 bpd), Egypt has said that
Israel will be able to purchase oil on normal commercial terms. (C)

-- If Israel does activate the Sinai II commitment, we
would be prepared to sell oil to Israel from our own supplies.
The precise mechanism for doing this remains to be determined,
but the most likely means would be diversion of oil destined
for the U.S. Stategic Petroleum Reserve. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY CARTER LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on January 3, 1985
 
#3
epartment of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585

January 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM SCHLESINGER

SUBJECT: U.S. OIL SUPPLY COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

The purpose of this memorandum, subsequent to our earlier
conversation, is to bring you up to date on our commitment
to supply oil to Israel. To this date, the Israelis have
been unsuccessful in locating alternative oil supplies to
offset the loss of Iranian crude oil, which normally
provides about two-thirds of domestic requirements.
Although the Israelis have indicated they will not
formally invoke our 1975 oil supply commitment during the
next few weeks, and perhaps not for 2-3 months, we are
preparing for such an action, which could eventually
require the export of U.S. domestic crude oil. Given
the possibility that Iranian sales to Israel might not
be resumed even if production is restored, there is
substantial risk that any temporary fix could be transformed
into a relatively permanent arrangement. The attachment
summarizes our commitment and details Israel's current
supply situation.

U.S. Options

As discussed with the Israelis, we would anticipate using
our "good offices" to persuade other countries to sell oil
to Israel. Primary targets would be the U.K. and Norway.
The problem here is that both countries have turned down
Israeli requests for oil in recent months for a variety
of foreign policy and domestic considerations. Mexico
could divert an increasing volume of growing oil exports.
The Mexicans have already increased oil sales to Israel,
to about 40,000 b/d, but have indicated reluctance to
increase sales further. Our intervention on Israel's behalf
on the eve of your visit to Mexico could add unwanted
complications.

I don't believe The have asked U.K.

The second set of options, direct USG purchases for resale
to Israel, would be the next recourse if our "good offices"
approach fails. Some governments might be more willing to
sell to the USG than directly to the Israelis. Such an
arrangement might work on a short-time basis but it would
quickly become known to the supplying country and would
likely be cancelled.

Our last recourse would be to export U.S. domestic crude
oil. Any exports of domestic crude oil would have to be
compensated in domestic markets with similar volumes of
foreign imports. U.S. exports to Israel pose a variety
of domestic political and legal issues. We are currently
working with the Departments of State, Interior, and
Commerce to assess the feasibility of exporting domestic
crude from various sources for Israeli consumption.

Alaska North Slope crude oil would be available in sufficient
quantities to meet Israeli needs. While the
legal restrictions on Alaskan exports are stringent and
subject to Congressional veto, I believe that either a
legislative exception could be obtained or administrative
means would be available to meet the U.S. commitment to
Israel. If the Administration gained an exception for
exports to Israel, this could create a precedent for
exports or exchange agreements with other countries. The
Department will soon forward a proposal to you on the
possibility of a broader program of exports or exchanges
of Alaskan oil.

Crude oil from California may also be available for export
to meet a substantial portion of Israeli needs. While this
oil is not excess to current refinery needs, significant
amounts of California crude are controlled by individuals
who are sympathetic to and might have strong incentives to
make this oil available to Israel. We estimate that up to
50,000 barrels a day of this California crude oil could be
bid out of the California market. Because of the current
transportation system in California, there may be some
potential bottlenecks in transporting the crude. By law,
any U.S. exports of crude would be sold at the world price
and the seller would be required to purchase entitlements.
Hence, exports of domestic crude would not transfer the
benefits of price controls to Israel.

May be best of us sources are required
Oil from the Gulf Coast region is the only other source of
onshore domestic crude in the contiguous United States that
is logistically available for export. It would be difficult
to find readily available supplies of oil in this area,
particularly with current scarcity of supply brought about
by the Iranian cutbacks. Exports from the Gulf Coast
could probably only be triggered by Federal allocation
orders, presenting a range of legal and political problems.

Oil produced from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) represents
a final possibility. Although the 1975 commitment with the
Israelis mentions OCS oil as the agreed-upon source of exports,
all current OCS production is committed to U.S. refinery
purchasers. Furthermore, U.S. law requires that about 60%
of OCS oil be sold to small refineries. Changing these
commitments to refineries would require a reallocation of
oil and would have substantial legal and political repercussions.
In addition, the quality of OCS oil is higher
than that required for Israeli refinery operations, adding
to the price of the OCS oil to Israel.

When analysis of these options is completed, we will give
you our final recommendations for action.
Commitment to Israel

During the negotiations leading to the partial Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai in 1975, the United States
and Israel concluded a Memorandum of Agreement that
committed the United States to "make oil available for
purchase by Israel" if it were unable to find enough
on the world market "to meet its normal requirements
for domestic consumption." The Administration informed
Congress in October 1975 that this was a legally binding
commitment.

We have met with the Israelis periodically over the last
two years and have agreed to a "contingency-planning
working paper" which calls for the following in the
event Israeli supplies are interrupted:

1. Initially use our "good offices" with appropriate
countries and companies to find other sources of
oil that could be sold directly to Israel.

2. If our "good offices" were not sufficient, seek to
act as middleman, buying the oil ourselves and
reselling it to Israel. This could provide some
"cover" for countries and companies willing to sell
indirectly to Israel.

3. As a last resort, export U.S.-produced OCS oil, based
on a Presidential finding of the need to exercise a
USG right of first refusal with respect to that oil.

In determining the amount of oil to be supplied, if the
United States is suffering a supply shortfall, Israel
would be treated by the United States as an additional
member of the International Energy Agency, i.e., Israel
would be entitled to 93 percent of normal supplies.

Israel's Oil Supply Situation

Israel has until recently been importing about 95,000
barrels per day (bpd) or about two-thirds of its oil
requirements from Iran. Most of the remainder comes
from the Alma fields in the Gulf of Suez (30,000 bpd),
a major focus in the treaty negotiations at present,
and from Mexico (25,000 bpd) with lesser amounts
through indirect purchases from Gabon and Venezuela.
Most of the Iranian oil comes from two joint ventures owned
50 percent by NIOC and 50 percent by U.S. companies. The
sales, however, are solely from the account of NIOC. Israel
has received only two shiploads from Iran since the fields
were first struck in late October. While the Iranian
suppliers have promised to resume shipments "when possible,"
there is increasing doubt that the shipments will be resumed.
One Israeli tanker is currently standing by in the Persian
Gulf.

The Israelis have continually tried to diversify their longterm
sources of supply with only marginal success; Arab
producers and most oil companies will not sell to them. Some
non-Arab members, such as Gabon and Venezuela have sold to
Israel but "under the table" through middlemen. Mexico
has been most responsive, agreeing recently to increase
shipments to 40,000 bpd. Both Norway and the U.K. (British
National Oil Company) have recently refused to sell oil to
the Israelis.

Based on a recent conversation with Israeli officials, their
current Israeli supply outlook for 1979 is:

Requested Commitments
Domestic Production (Alma Fields) 30,000 30,000 b/d
Imports:
Iran 80,000 Uncertain
Mexico 45,000 40,000
Africa and South America 35,000 10,000
TOTAL 190,000 80,000
Domestic Consumption 156,000 156,000
Shortfall - 76,000

Israel is well prepared for a wartime interruption in its
supplies. Oil stockpiles are sufficient for 6-7 months at
normal consumption rates. However, our bilateral agreement
does not require Israel to use up its stock before turning
to the United States. Nevertheless, these stockpiles give
both countries some flexibility in dealing with the current
situation.

SECRET
Attachment
COPY CARTER LIBRARY
SECRET
Memorandum for President Jimmy Carter from James Schlesinger regarding the U.S. oil supply commitment to Israel. Memo. Department of Energy. SECRET. Issue Date: Jan 8, 1979. Date Declassified: Dec 07, 1998. Unsanitized. Complete. 5 page(s).
 
#4
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Cyrus Vance
2. US Approach to UK and Norway Requesting Consideration
of Oil Sales to Israel - I have instructed our Ambassadors in
London and Oslo to request, that in light of events in Iran, the
UK and Norway seriously consider selling oil to Israel. During
Peter Jay's call on me today I reinforced this message.


Both countries turned down Israel this past year citing
a lack of uncommitted oil for sale. We and the Israelis
still believe that, for political reasons, the UK and Norway
are the two most promising potential new suppliers, and Israel
has asked us to use our good offices with them.

If this approach fails, we will consider interceding with
other potential suppliers. If Israel is unable to make up
the shortfall from Iran, we will have to activate our oil supply
commitment. State is chairing a high level inter-agency group
which is developing detailed contingency plans, which should be
ready for your review before the end of the month, on implementing
our commitment. The Israelis have recently told
Sam Lewis that they will not invoke our supply commitment
before getting down to three months reserves, which should
not occur for a few months.

3. Iraq - The Iraqis have informally told us in Baghdad
that they are not inclined to pursue our offer to reestablish
relations at the present time. We assume from our conversations
with the Iraqis that they believe they cannot, under present
circumstances in the Middle East, explain to other Arab states
resumption of relations.
 
#5
ISRAEL: ENERGY MINSTER VISITS UNITED STATES (U)
Israeli Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai will visit Washington this week to finalize
the procedures for invoking the US-Israeli oil supply agreement signed last year. He
may attempt to invoke the agreement even though Israel's oil supply sit latino is quite
favorable. The Energy minister will also seek financial and assistance for the
Israeli oil sector. Oil exploration and oil shale development programs now envisaged
by Israeli planners could easily involve a total investment of several billion dollars.
Modai may also raise the issue of additional US financial assistance for the
construction of oil storage facilities. (C NF)
The Oil Supply Agreement
The Governments of the United States and Israel singed a 15-year oil supply
agreement last year under which the United States agrees to provide oil to Israel if the
Israeli Governments cannot procure sufficient supplies. The agreement, however, is
United States for all costs incurred in providing the oil. The agreement, however, is
vague about the specific conditions that must apply before Israel can invoke the
agreement and the procedures involved in the invocation. The United States and Israel
have been these issues for almost a year and ostensibly Modai's visit is to
finalize the operational aspects. (C NF)
According to Israeli press articles, however, Modai plans to invoke, as well as
finalize, the during his visit. He will argue that for security reasons, Israel
needs and assumed flow of oil at stable prices. (The Israeli Government estimates it will
pay $2 billion for oil imports this year, compared with $1.4 billion in 1979) Modai will
point out that Israeli access to Alaskan crude would enable Israel to meet its oil needs
much more economically than through spot market purchases during a supply
shortage. Legislation would have to be passed by Congress before Israel could
purchase Alaskan crude. (S NF)
According to an Israeli press report, the Begin government's apparent decision to
press the issue now reflects a fear that the United states will renege on the agreement
if the Israelis seek invocation during a world supply crisis. The article points to Israeli
perceptions of US attempts to change UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the US
failure to stand by the commitment to set up an international force to monitor the
Sinai as reasons to distrust US promises. The Israelis probably have also come to the
conclusion that Congress would find it politically difficult to allow alaskan oil to be
shipped to Israel, particularly if Americans are sitting in gas lines, and that the
administration and Congress would be more likely to be sympathetic to Israel's request
in an election year. (C NF)
Modai may decide not to invoke the agreement at this time if members of
Congress indicate little support. He might also be dissuaded if he can obtain US
assistance for this energy development program. (C NF)
Oil Suppliers
Israel is currently receiving about half of its 170,000 b/d crude requirement from
Egypt and Mexico. When Israel relinquished the Alma oil field to Egypt last
November, Cairo agreed to sell Israel 40,000 b/d of crude this year. While the details
of this sale are closely held by both sides, it appears that Israeli oil companies are
paying the extremely high official Egyptian price, after which Cairo gives a rebate to
the Israeli Government. Israeli-Egyptian negotiations for next year's deliveries will be
held in november Israel will purchase about 50,000 b/d this year under oils long-term,
contract with Mexico (S NF)
We believe the Israelis purchased another 30,000 b/d of Venezuelan and
Gabbiness oil through trading companies on short-term contracts. The remaining
50,000 b/d of the Israeli requirement is purchased on the spot market (S NF)
Although the Israelis have discussed several energy conservation measures, only
one measure has been enacted--an increase in the purchase tax on cars with engine
displacements of more than 1.600 cubic centimeters Repeated gasoline price hikes
have done little to stimulate conservation because many Israeli companies provide cars
and gasoline to their workers as a fringe benefit. In fact, since transportation accounts
for only 10 percent of energy use, proposed measures aimed at limiting auto use, such
as carless days, will have only a minimal impact on consumption. (U)
Israel's longer term efforts to hold down oil imports will prove more successful,
and Israel's hopes to reduce its dependence on oil as a source of energy from 98
percent now to 50 percent in 1990 seem well within reach. All future electricity-generating
facilities will be equipped to burn coal as well as oil. and the feasibility of
converting existing oil-fired plants to coal is being studied. The first new power station
is due to come on stream late this year; it will operated on oil at first, until a coal
unloading facility is completed, Israel also hopes to rely more heavily on solar energy
but this will have only a marginal impact on oil imports for the foreseeable future
Although Israel is considering construction of a nuclear-generating plant, serious
technical and safeguards issues will prevent any nuclear power reactor from coming
on stream before 1990 at the earliest. (C).
Oil Exploration Oil Shale Development
Modai is expected to request US financial and technical assistance for oil
exploration and oil shale development. Israel has some 700 million to 2,000 million tons
of oil shale, Equivalent to 250 million to 750 million barrels of oil, and hopes to
build a plant which will produce 20,000 to 40,000 b/d from shale. The Israeli
Government estimates investment in such a plant at from $550 million to $1,700
million over 15 years Moreover, if the plant were successful, Israel would want to
expand its production capability. Little is known about Modai's oil exploration
proposals but presumably he will ask for assistance, particularly in high-cost offshore
exploration.
Oil Storage
After the 1975 Sinai II agreement when Israel returned the El Morgan fields,
which provided the bulk of its energy needs, to Egypt, the United States promised to
consider providing $200 million over four years to assist Israel in increasing its oil
storage facilities and to pay for the oil to stored. The United States provided cash
grants of $150 million in both 1976 and 1977 to be used both for the oil storage project
and for new Sinai defense lines, in whatever proportion the Israelis desired. The cash
grants, however, were part of the overall annual supporting assistance level of $785
million, rather than additional aid, and in any event, the storage facilities were never
built primarily because of siting problems. Modai apparently now wants to build the
oil storage facilities and wants the United States to provide additional funds co cover
construction and to pay for the oil to be stored. (C NF) (Secret Noforn)