Когда читаешь материалы по различным истребителям, то обнаруживаешь поразительную вещь -- они очень часто противоречат друг другу, иногда даже у одного автора. Я думаю участникам форума будут интересны приведенные мной ниже материалы, но если вы внимательно их будете читать, то увидите как много там нестыковок.
www.airwar.ru
Воздушные схватки МиГ-21 с Миражами велись, в основном, на равных. МиГ-21 имел несколько лучшую маневренность, но уступал Миражу в обзоре из кабины и продолжительности полета.
Мираж относился к истребителям целевого назначения. Малая нагрузка на дельтовидное крыло (менее 300 кг/м2 ), неплохие пилотажные характеристики и встроенная 30-мм пушка обеспечивали Миражу эффективное ведение маневренного боя. Но Мираж несколько уступал МиГ-21 в тяговооруженности, что означало отставание в скороподъемности и разгоне скорости в бою. Этот разрыв увеличивался в диапазоне больших высот.
Избыток тяги в умелых руках летчика МиГ-21 позволял контролировать дистанцию до противника, то есть быстрее сближаться или отрываться от него. Это было важно, так как длительное маневрирование с разворотливым Миражом не сулило ничего хорошего. Главным правилом в тактике борьбы с Миражом определялась "серия атак" с сохранением энергии, т.е. способности к дальнейшему ускорению.
Вот, пожалуйста, "МиГ-21 имел несколько лучшую маневренность",
и "Мираж несколько уступал МиГу-21 в тяговооруженности", но "...длительное маневрирование с разворотливым Миражом не сулило ничего хорошего". Позвольте спросить: Как же так, и это после всего того, что вы сами сообщили нам. Читаешь, и просто диву даешься. А еще тот их лозунг: "Увидишь Мираж - не становись в вираж". Это, спрашивается, почему же, если у вас и маневренность лучше, и тяги больше? Чудеса, и только. Но есть противоречия и у приведенных ниже англоязычных авторов. Я, конечно, привел здесь лишь несколько.
“Shield of David” (197 by M. Rubenstein & R. Goldman.
Israeli pilots test-flew the MiG-21, entering into mock combat with their own Mirages. The MiG-21 was found to be underpowered, though fairly maneuverable at high altitude. The MiG possessed excellent acceleration which was achieved through its small size and aerodynamic refinement rather than through a high-thrust engine. Its range was also very limited.
http://www.iaf.co.il/iaf/doa_iis.dll/Serve/item/English/1.3.3.7.3.4.html
In August 1966, an Iraqi pilot defected to Israel in a late-model MiG-21F-13 (Fishbed-C). The IAF began studying the plane. The first to fly it was - who else - Danny Sha-pira, the IAF's veteran chief test pilot.
The systems in the cockpit were bulky and unwieldy. The pilot's view of the out-side world was almost completely blocked off, and turning his head sideways was difficult. The Russians believed that the pilot should look forward at all times.
In the air, Danny Shapira discovered that the MiG-21 was a powerful bird. When taking off simultaneously with a Mirage, the MiG shot ahead and accelerated better, in both subsonic and supersonic speeds. Its drawbacks became apparent at low-altitude high-speed flight: the high pressure on the rudders limited the plane's maneuverability, which - under those conditions - was not much better than a Piper's.
In the course of the test flights, Shapira gradually discovered the areas in which the MiG-21 could be outperformed by Mirages. He imparted his discoveries to pilots from the different squadrons, advising them to try and engage the MiG-21 in specific altitudes and speeds, which would put the MiG-21 at a disadvantage.
“No Margin for Error” (1993) by Ehud Yonay
On August 16, 1966, an Iraqi defector landed a MiG-21 in perfect working order on the Hazor tarmac and Dani Shapira, the IAF’s chief test pilot, took the MiG through every nook and cranny of its flight envelope. “We found out that at high speeds it had trouble maneuvering as well as the Mirage, which meant that we had to try to get it into tight turns at high speeds. Also, at slow speeds it had a tendency to spin out, and at tight turns at low altitudes it would snap and flick into the ground.” After completing his test series and writing a book on the MiG-21, Shapira began flying it alongside and against the Mirages. By the end of the year, each Mirage squadron was thoroughly familiar with every as-pect of what was heretofore the world’s most mysterious and formidable fighter.
“Israel’s Best Defense” (1993) by E. Cohen
When the Chief Test Pilot of the IAF, Danny Shapira got into the cockpit of the MiG-21 for the first time, he was surprised by a plethora of levers and buttons in an illogical order. It looked very inferior to the elegant Mirage with its ‘no hands’ flight. Iraqi Captain Muneir Radfa, who brought the plane to Israel from Iraq, agreed that the cockpit was uncomfortable and disorganized, but insisted that the plane was easy to fly. The first flight confirmed his words; it was easy. To Danny, it felt like the Mirage, but was a bit faster and had a lower peak altitude of 40,000 feet. When Danny began to maneuver, he discovered how the MiG differed from the Mirage. The MiG was difficult to steer at speeds over 500 knots. Danny had to use tremendous strength on the stick to steady the plane in turns, especially in sharp ones. At greater speeds the danger increased. The nose and the right wing pulled downward. Since the back of the cockpit was obstructed, the pilot’s field of vision was severely limited. After many dogfights, Danny concluded that in terms of handling, the MiG-21 was even with the Mirage.
“Air Warfare in the Missile Age” (1985) by Lon Nordeen
The Israelis highly rated the MiG-21 as a medium-altitude dogfight aircraft. With its slightly higher thrust-to-weight ratio and lower wing-loading, it was able to out-accelerate and out-turn the Mirage IIIC. Nevertheless, the Mirage’s pilots managed to shoot down MiG-21s as Arab pilots generally did not fly the plane to its limits of performance.
However, the MiG-21 was found to be highly susceptible to battle damage, having a tendency to burn or explode after being struck only a few times with 30-mm cannon fire. On the opposite, a Mirage was hit by the Soviet-built Atoll infrared-guided air-to-air missile fired from an Iraqi MiG-21 over an Iraqi airbase where the Mirage was patrolling. The Mirage’s tailpipe suffered extensive damage, but the pilot was able to return to the base.]
Peebles, Curtis. Dark Eagles. Novato, CA, USA: Presidio, 1995
Capt. Monir Radfa, an Iraqi pilot, took off from Rashid Air Base outside Baghdad and landed at Hatzor Air Base in Israel on August 16, 1966, with his Mig-21F-13. For the next several months, it was subjected to a series of flights to learn its strengths and weaknesses. These were made by Lt. Col. Dani Shapira, the Israeli Air Force’s chief test pilot. He recalled later: “We found out, for example, that at high speed it had trouble maneuvering as well as the Mirage, which meant we had to try to get it into tight turns at high speeds.”
At low speeds, the Mig-21 would tend to spin out in tight, low-altitude turns. The Mig-21 was then used to train Israeli Mirage pilots. Some 100 hours were spent flying in mock combat with Israeli Mirages. By the end of the year, every Mirage squadron had been familiarized with the Mig-21.
XXX
MiG-21: Its delta wing allows it to turn very well, but the induced drag of that configuration ‘bleeds’ energy rapidly and when MiG-21 turns, it costs. So the trick is to get the MiG-21 down to an altitude below 20,000 feet. That’s where the Phantom really performs well with its wing; it turns and accelerates well. But if you get above 20,000 feet and tangle with a MiG-21, he will chew you to pieces because of the advantages of his wing and his speed.
Steve Ritchie, a Phantom ace, considers the MiG-21’s speed and turning ability to be excellent, but the MiG has roll rate troubles at maximum speed, as well as longitudinal stability problems.
The delta--wing design of the Mig-21 also loses energy in turns faster than the F-4 does and the Mig has a tendency to lose speed in turns.
“Aircraft vs Aircraft” (1986) by N. Franks.
Full-afterburner thrust:
MiG-21 -- 13,117 lb.
Mirage 3C -- 13,670 lb.
The MiG-21’s delta-wing configuration gave it poor lift at subsonic speeds.
In a high-angle-of-attack situation, the MiG-21 bucks about almost uncontrollably and can only be pointed rather than aimed.
“The Threat” by Cockburn.
The handling of the MiG-21 was bad. U.S. pilots who flew the 12 MiG-21s presented to the U.S. by Egypt in 1978 reported that below 15,000-feet altitude, where the air is dens-er, the control stick becomes very difficult to move: “Like pulling on a telegraph pole” was one comment. The cockpit visibility was extremely bad.
“Modern Fighter Combat” (1987) by Mike Spick.
The MiG-21 design is based on tailed delta wing planform while the French Mirage was a tailless delta. The pure delta has many advantages in high-altitude, high-speed flight. It also has no clearly defined point of stall and develops max lift at very high angles of incidence. But it pays a high price in increased drag. Drag is also high while maneuvering.
The tailed delta avoided the worst drawbacks of the tailless variety.
Turning ability of the MiG-21 is good and at the lower speed levels it is very good. But increase speed to Mach 0.9 at 15,000-feet altitude and the MiG-21’s instantaneous turn rate becomes worse than that of the Phantom though still better than the Mirage 3C can achieve.
The controls are heavy, to a degree where a fair amount of muscle is needed. The pilot’s view out is not good, rear vision is almost non-existent and even the view ahead is restricted by both avionics displays and a heavy canopy bow. A fairly low fuel fraction reduces the combat radius without external fuel to a ridiculously short distance. The performance above 20,000 feet was described as poor.
The truth is that the MiG-21 is a very ordinary fighter and had it been of Western origin, it would have probably sunk without trace prior to 1970.
At the same time, the latest MiG-21bis (Fishbed-N) has a more powerful engine and a far superior thrust-to-weight ratio. Its performance has to improve dramatically and it must be a formidable dogfighter.
www.airwar.ru
Воздушные схватки МиГ-21 с Миражами велись, в основном, на равных. МиГ-21 имел несколько лучшую маневренность, но уступал Миражу в обзоре из кабины и продолжительности полета.
Мираж относился к истребителям целевого назначения. Малая нагрузка на дельтовидное крыло (менее 300 кг/м2 ), неплохие пилотажные характеристики и встроенная 30-мм пушка обеспечивали Миражу эффективное ведение маневренного боя. Но Мираж несколько уступал МиГ-21 в тяговооруженности, что означало отставание в скороподъемности и разгоне скорости в бою. Этот разрыв увеличивался в диапазоне больших высот.
Избыток тяги в умелых руках летчика МиГ-21 позволял контролировать дистанцию до противника, то есть быстрее сближаться или отрываться от него. Это было важно, так как длительное маневрирование с разворотливым Миражом не сулило ничего хорошего. Главным правилом в тактике борьбы с Миражом определялась "серия атак" с сохранением энергии, т.е. способности к дальнейшему ускорению.
Вот, пожалуйста, "МиГ-21 имел несколько лучшую маневренность",
и "Мираж несколько уступал МиГу-21 в тяговооруженности", но "...длительное маневрирование с разворотливым Миражом не сулило ничего хорошего". Позвольте спросить: Как же так, и это после всего того, что вы сами сообщили нам. Читаешь, и просто диву даешься. А еще тот их лозунг: "Увидишь Мираж - не становись в вираж". Это, спрашивается, почему же, если у вас и маневренность лучше, и тяги больше? Чудеса, и только. Но есть противоречия и у приведенных ниже англоязычных авторов. Я, конечно, привел здесь лишь несколько.
“Shield of David” (197 by M. Rubenstein & R. Goldman.
Israeli pilots test-flew the MiG-21, entering into mock combat with their own Mirages. The MiG-21 was found to be underpowered, though fairly maneuverable at high altitude. The MiG possessed excellent acceleration which was achieved through its small size and aerodynamic refinement rather than through a high-thrust engine. Its range was also very limited.
http://www.iaf.co.il/iaf/doa_iis.dll/Serve/item/English/1.3.3.7.3.4.html
In August 1966, an Iraqi pilot defected to Israel in a late-model MiG-21F-13 (Fishbed-C). The IAF began studying the plane. The first to fly it was - who else - Danny Sha-pira, the IAF's veteran chief test pilot.
The systems in the cockpit were bulky and unwieldy. The pilot's view of the out-side world was almost completely blocked off, and turning his head sideways was difficult. The Russians believed that the pilot should look forward at all times.
In the air, Danny Shapira discovered that the MiG-21 was a powerful bird. When taking off simultaneously with a Mirage, the MiG shot ahead and accelerated better, in both subsonic and supersonic speeds. Its drawbacks became apparent at low-altitude high-speed flight: the high pressure on the rudders limited the plane's maneuverability, which - under those conditions - was not much better than a Piper's.
In the course of the test flights, Shapira gradually discovered the areas in which the MiG-21 could be outperformed by Mirages. He imparted his discoveries to pilots from the different squadrons, advising them to try and engage the MiG-21 in specific altitudes and speeds, which would put the MiG-21 at a disadvantage.
“No Margin for Error” (1993) by Ehud Yonay
On August 16, 1966, an Iraqi defector landed a MiG-21 in perfect working order on the Hazor tarmac and Dani Shapira, the IAF’s chief test pilot, took the MiG through every nook and cranny of its flight envelope. “We found out that at high speeds it had trouble maneuvering as well as the Mirage, which meant that we had to try to get it into tight turns at high speeds. Also, at slow speeds it had a tendency to spin out, and at tight turns at low altitudes it would snap and flick into the ground.” After completing his test series and writing a book on the MiG-21, Shapira began flying it alongside and against the Mirages. By the end of the year, each Mirage squadron was thoroughly familiar with every as-pect of what was heretofore the world’s most mysterious and formidable fighter.
“Israel’s Best Defense” (1993) by E. Cohen
When the Chief Test Pilot of the IAF, Danny Shapira got into the cockpit of the MiG-21 for the first time, he was surprised by a plethora of levers and buttons in an illogical order. It looked very inferior to the elegant Mirage with its ‘no hands’ flight. Iraqi Captain Muneir Radfa, who brought the plane to Israel from Iraq, agreed that the cockpit was uncomfortable and disorganized, but insisted that the plane was easy to fly. The first flight confirmed his words; it was easy. To Danny, it felt like the Mirage, but was a bit faster and had a lower peak altitude of 40,000 feet. When Danny began to maneuver, he discovered how the MiG differed from the Mirage. The MiG was difficult to steer at speeds over 500 knots. Danny had to use tremendous strength on the stick to steady the plane in turns, especially in sharp ones. At greater speeds the danger increased. The nose and the right wing pulled downward. Since the back of the cockpit was obstructed, the pilot’s field of vision was severely limited. After many dogfights, Danny concluded that in terms of handling, the MiG-21 was even with the Mirage.
“Air Warfare in the Missile Age” (1985) by Lon Nordeen
The Israelis highly rated the MiG-21 as a medium-altitude dogfight aircraft. With its slightly higher thrust-to-weight ratio and lower wing-loading, it was able to out-accelerate and out-turn the Mirage IIIC. Nevertheless, the Mirage’s pilots managed to shoot down MiG-21s as Arab pilots generally did not fly the plane to its limits of performance.
However, the MiG-21 was found to be highly susceptible to battle damage, having a tendency to burn or explode after being struck only a few times with 30-mm cannon fire. On the opposite, a Mirage was hit by the Soviet-built Atoll infrared-guided air-to-air missile fired from an Iraqi MiG-21 over an Iraqi airbase where the Mirage was patrolling. The Mirage’s tailpipe suffered extensive damage, but the pilot was able to return to the base.]
Peebles, Curtis. Dark Eagles. Novato, CA, USA: Presidio, 1995
Capt. Monir Radfa, an Iraqi pilot, took off from Rashid Air Base outside Baghdad and landed at Hatzor Air Base in Israel on August 16, 1966, with his Mig-21F-13. For the next several months, it was subjected to a series of flights to learn its strengths and weaknesses. These were made by Lt. Col. Dani Shapira, the Israeli Air Force’s chief test pilot. He recalled later: “We found out, for example, that at high speed it had trouble maneuvering as well as the Mirage, which meant we had to try to get it into tight turns at high speeds.”
At low speeds, the Mig-21 would tend to spin out in tight, low-altitude turns. The Mig-21 was then used to train Israeli Mirage pilots. Some 100 hours were spent flying in mock combat with Israeli Mirages. By the end of the year, every Mirage squadron had been familiarized with the Mig-21.
XXX
MiG-21: Its delta wing allows it to turn very well, but the induced drag of that configuration ‘bleeds’ energy rapidly and when MiG-21 turns, it costs. So the trick is to get the MiG-21 down to an altitude below 20,000 feet. That’s where the Phantom really performs well with its wing; it turns and accelerates well. But if you get above 20,000 feet and tangle with a MiG-21, he will chew you to pieces because of the advantages of his wing and his speed.
Steve Ritchie, a Phantom ace, considers the MiG-21’s speed and turning ability to be excellent, but the MiG has roll rate troubles at maximum speed, as well as longitudinal stability problems.
The delta--wing design of the Mig-21 also loses energy in turns faster than the F-4 does and the Mig has a tendency to lose speed in turns.
“Aircraft vs Aircraft” (1986) by N. Franks.
Full-afterburner thrust:
MiG-21 -- 13,117 lb.
Mirage 3C -- 13,670 lb.
The MiG-21’s delta-wing configuration gave it poor lift at subsonic speeds.
In a high-angle-of-attack situation, the MiG-21 bucks about almost uncontrollably and can only be pointed rather than aimed.
“The Threat” by Cockburn.
The handling of the MiG-21 was bad. U.S. pilots who flew the 12 MiG-21s presented to the U.S. by Egypt in 1978 reported that below 15,000-feet altitude, where the air is dens-er, the control stick becomes very difficult to move: “Like pulling on a telegraph pole” was one comment. The cockpit visibility was extremely bad.
“Modern Fighter Combat” (1987) by Mike Spick.
The MiG-21 design is based on tailed delta wing planform while the French Mirage was a tailless delta. The pure delta has many advantages in high-altitude, high-speed flight. It also has no clearly defined point of stall and develops max lift at very high angles of incidence. But it pays a high price in increased drag. Drag is also high while maneuvering.
The tailed delta avoided the worst drawbacks of the tailless variety.
Turning ability of the MiG-21 is good and at the lower speed levels it is very good. But increase speed to Mach 0.9 at 15,000-feet altitude and the MiG-21’s instantaneous turn rate becomes worse than that of the Phantom though still better than the Mirage 3C can achieve.
The controls are heavy, to a degree where a fair amount of muscle is needed. The pilot’s view out is not good, rear vision is almost non-existent and even the view ahead is restricted by both avionics displays and a heavy canopy bow. A fairly low fuel fraction reduces the combat radius without external fuel to a ridiculously short distance. The performance above 20,000 feet was described as poor.
The truth is that the MiG-21 is a very ordinary fighter and had it been of Western origin, it would have probably sunk without trace prior to 1970.
At the same time, the latest MiG-21bis (Fishbed-N) has a more powerful engine and a far superior thrust-to-weight ratio. Its performance has to improve dramatically and it must be a formidable dogfighter.