Posted: Thu Jul 26, 2007 4:37 pm—
Заглавная статья Дэвида Эшеля в JED за июль 2007.
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| The Israel-Lebanon War One Year Later
Electronic Warfare in the Second Lebanon War Journal of Electronic Defense, July 2007 By Colonel David Eshel, IDF Ret. Israel is rated among the leading world powers in the development of electronic warfare (EW) systems, but the watershed date of July 12, 2006, when its second war with Lebanon began, caused a stir among the international EW community. After the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which was considered the first EW conflict for Israel, a close symbiotic relationship evolved between Israeli and US electronics firms, resulting in the development of sophisticated EW systems. Over the years, huge investments followed to establish a network of advanced EW systems that could totally blind any hostile communications system during the initial stages of a major conflict. During the first days of the July 2006 war, Israeli intelligence experts were convinced that their "electronic blanket" over South Lebanon was so effective that it jammed Hezbollah's entire military communications network, including its cell phone communications. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) general staff officers were under the illusion that they had knocked out Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's communication links from his subterranean Beirut bunker to his frontline command posts and his strategic logistic links with Damascus and Tehran. But they were in for a painful surprise. Hezbollah's Intelligence War The IDF received its first indication that something was terribly wrong on the evening of Friday, July 14. Shortly before 8 p.m., two Iranian-made C-802 Silkworm anti-ship missiles were fired from a Hezbollah coastal base near Beirut. One of the two missiles struck an Israeli Saar-5 corvette, the INS Hanit, killing four crew members. The Hanit escaped sinking by sheer luck. The missile struck the corvette's stern, disabling the propulsion system. After-action findings from an exhaustive post-war probe into the C-802 attack on the INS Hanit determined that operational readiness deficiencies, rather than technology failings, were the cause. Despite initial suspicions that a radar malfunction contributed to the ship's lack of defense, Israeli naval experts admitted the apparent failure in the IAI/Elta Pulse Doppler surveillance system had affected only detection range, not accuracy, and that even the range-degraded radar would have detected the incoming threat had it been operated properly at the time of the attack. Moreover, the locally-made Barak ship defense system was in optimum condition to track, identify and intercept the Chinese-origin missile had the crew not deactivated the system prior to attack. Surprisingly, the other ship defenses, such as the U.S.-produced Phalanx and the Elbit Deceiver decoy control and launching system, were fully functional but languishing in standby mode at the time of the attack. Hezbollah forces scored other successes during the war. Post-war investigation revealed that Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had provided Hezbollah with an EW arm equipped with special state-of-the art systems which were capable of circumventing large segments of Israel's sophisticated EW network in the combat zone. In addition, Hezbollah's ability to enforce communication security discipline on its field commanders came as a surprise to senior IDF commanders, who later concluded that Hezbollah's communications capabilities may have survived Israel's air onslaught, that the Hezbollah leadership was in touch with its commanders on the ground and that these commanders were able to maintain a robust communications network despite massive Israeli interdiction missions. But this success was not due to COM-SEC alone. Entering into captured Hezbollah underground command bunkers, Israeli EW experts were surprised by the sophisticated protective mechanisms attached to Hezbollah's Iranian-made communications networks, which were discovered to be connected by optical fibers not susceptible to electronic jamming. The Iranian electronic engineers' success proved such that on Wednesday, August 9, nearly four weeks into the war, Hezbollah's communications networks were still operating at points only 500 meters from the Israeli border. It soon became clear that both American and Israeli experts had underestimated Iranian EW expertise in fielding rather simple means to overcome the latest EW systems the West could offer in support of modern warfare. Although IDF intelligence had been monitoring Hezbollah electronic activities along the Lebanese border region for several years - since the unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 - adequate proof was lacking to substantiate these claims. Then, after a fierce battle at a Hezbollah stronghold just south of the Litani River, the bodies of three Iranian intelligence officers were discovered. They were carrying personal documents and gear that indicated they had been involved in operating sophisticated ELINT equipment and EW jamming devices blinding IDF radar and tactical communications. The IDF also found equipment in Hezbollah underground war rooms that was marked in Iranian codes and instructional documentations. On July 25, Brigadier-General Gal Hirsch, who commanded the IDF regular Division deployed along the border region, told the press that his troops found rooms full of Iranian-made equipment that included eavesdropping devices, computers, modern communications equipment, up-to-date and detailed military maps of Israeli strategic targets, and even lists of telephone numbers inside Israel. Part of the success in Hezbollah's decisive battlefield performance was that it was gleaning valuable combat intelligence by monitoring telephone conversations between Israeli reservists and their families on their personal mobile phones, which had not been collected by their commanders before going into battle. An After-Battle Assessment This rather critical and frank description of Israel's failure in its initial EW performance may easily lead to an assumption that everything went wrong in Israel's conduct of the war. However, there were highly successful aspects of the EW campaign as well. Mossad and air force intelligence had achieved an unprecedented standard of high-precision intelligence on the hideouts of Hezbollah medium- and long-range rockets, most of them carefully camouflaged. Many of these rockets essentially were "embedded" inside civilian homes, where the organization had "rented" rooms. Examples of such concealments were later shown in aerial reconnaissance photos and video images of secondary explosions during Israeli Air Force attacks of apparently innocent farmhouses - explosions that revealed the existence of stored explosives. Some of these activities were monitored throughout the years by Israeli UAVs, and this intelligence provided important targeting information for preemptive strikes. Intelligence was so accurate that pilots were briefed on their specific targets with special map displays pointing directly to the rooms where rockets had been located. GPS data was calibrated to square-meter precision, which was pre-programmed in JDAM bomb coordinates. This measure of precision-enabled, point-target destruction of the hidden rockets occurred with near 100 percent accuracy. At the outbreak of the war, local "sleeper" cells went into action, with special forces using lasers to "paint" targets, which then were attacked by Israeli fighter jets. Within 36 hours, most of Hezbollah's strategic missile arsenal was destroyed. Tehran's painfully built-up and highly invested strategic forward base in Lebanon went up in smoke. By the third night of the air campaign, the air force had attained full operational capability of the world's first Boost Phase Launch Intercept (BPLI) force. This was a closely linked network of manned aircraft, UAVs and ground-based surveillance that detected rocket launches and destroyed the launcher sites with immediate air strikes. IDE Military Intelligence gathering units 504 (HUMINT) and 8200 (SIGINT) were both tasked with obtaining vital intelligence on Hezbollah forward deployments in South Lebanon, and their work was significant during the initial stages of the war. For six years, since the IDF withdrew from its "security zone" in South Lebanon, Israel's intelligence community, including Mossad, Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, had watched Hezbollah's movements along the border, including the arrival of arms shipments from Iran via Syria. Observation posts along the border followed construction work of fortifications along the "Blue Line" and deployment of advanced COMINT equipment monitoring communications inside Israel. The material which was collected over the years was carefully depicted in top secret intelligence dossiers, providing information on Hezbollah bunkers and communications networks along the border line. One dossier even carried code maps in which every Hezbollah bunker was indicated. The problem was, as it is so often in military bureaucracy, that the dossiers were so secret that they did not reach the tactical command level until later in the war. Along the 120-km Lebanese-Israel border, the IDF had created a line of fortified outposts guarded by a sophisticated anti-infiltration fence. Electronic surveillance and reconnaissance drones flew day and night, monitoring Hezbollah movements. Over the years, the IDF had gained valuable experience using long-range electronic surveillance equipment, including advanced use of UAVs with ultra-rapid data links to launch immediate air or artillery strikes. However, due to the May 2000 UN-brokered "Blue Line" that demarcated the new international border, several topographical constraints created sensitive "dead zones" over which electronic surveillance was incomplete. From its observation posts along the border line, Hezbollah was able to determine these vulnerable spots. On July 12, a Hezbollah commando team infiltrated the fence to ambush an ill-briefed reservist patrol which had rushed in to check the alarm-alert issued by a nearby IDF outpost. This unfortunate action sparked the war that followed. New Israeli C2 Systems The first Israeli military implementation of the Terrestrial Trunked Radio Access Internet Protocol (TetraIP) marked the creation of a new terrestrial, nationwide military cellular network for the IDF that provided dependable, deploy-able voice and data services to military commanders. Code named "Vered Harim" (Mountain Rose), the system became operational in mid-2004, after almost four years of development and installation. This network is planned to integrate into the IDF's future "Digital Army Program" (Hebrew Zayad or "Hunter") as soon as data transfer capabilities become available. Vered Harim revolutionizes the IDF communications networks, transforming a hierarchical networking model into spatial connectivity infrastructure. The system replaced outdated means of communications, including terrestrial communications, wireless radio-telephone (RT) links and some combat net radio networks. The Israeli Army's Signals Corps has embedded its top-secret encryption and information security software into Motorola's technology, which is suited to the TETRA system. For the first time, Israeli commanders can utilize highly secure communications on the move anywhere they operate. The system also supports low data rate transfer. Currently, the system transfers images and messages with planned enhancements, including video services. According to the firm, a data transfer rate of up to 28.8 kbps is currently available to support forces deployed throughout the theater of operation. This bandwidth would be sufficient to transfer live video, utilizing compressed video transfer services provided by Visual Defense (Emblaze) systems. These networks can link to terrestrial networks or satellite communications systems to facilitate direct and seamless connectivity from the lowest echelon up to the national command level. The first combat employment of the Mountain Rose system occurred during the Second Lebanon War in July-August 2006, in which the network was rapidly expanding, responding to the surging demand for services by IDF divisions recruited for the operation. This expansion happened in parallel to the deployment of IDF Digital Army Systems (Zayad), responding to combat units. However, the rapid deployment of the new systems immediately exposed some of their Limitations, a problem characteristic in "over sophistication" at the combat level. While Mountain Rose provided IDF commanders with seamless one-on-one connectivity, it also contributed to the erosion of commanders' authority, especially in the higher echelon, disrupting the chain of command. Conducting one-on-one communications may have solved urgent issues, but it also kept command posts in the dark, as they did not have the ability to monitor communications and reports, or assess and update situational pictures. This lack of access became highly acute in emergency situations like medical evacuations, in which split-second multi-access communication coordination was vital in saving lives. Moving Too Quickly? For the first time, four (incomplete) brigade systems of the new IDF Digital Army Program were deployed in combat. Their positive effect depended on the manner in which commanders employed the system as a command tool. Many lessons can be learned from last summer's conflict, and the IDF is already implementing solutions in a highly intensive retraining process. "The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) may be rushing too quickly into its technology-driven arena," said Yiftah Ron-Tal, a recently retired major general and former commander of Israel's Ground Forces Command. "The concept is correct, as is our doctrine, but the problem is in its implementation. It may be that our priorities are not in proper order." A balanced combination of high technology and EW systems with more "boots on the ground" and traditional "follow me" leadership will probably be implemented into the IDF doctrine under its new chief of staff, General Gabi Ashkenazi. |
Posted: Thu Jul 26, 2007 7:03 pm—
| Vadim wrote: |
| Заглавная статья Дэвида Эшеля в JED за июль 2007.
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Давид Эшель насколько я помню танкист. И в РЭБ он понимает не более любого среднего любителя военной техники. А статья его написана по материалам израильской периодической печати, и книг вроде «Земля тряслась. 33 дня, Ливан, 2006 г.» и «В ливанском плену. Правда о Второй Ливанской войне».
Например о "Веред hарим" там есть, я говорю про этот отрывок:
| Quote: |
| This expansion happened in parallel to the deployment of IDF Digital Army Systems (Zayad), responding to combat units. However, the rapid deployment of the new systems immediately exposed some of their Limitations, a problem characteristic in "over sophistication" at the combat level. While Mountain Rose provided IDF commanders with seamless one-on-one connectivity, it also contributed to the erosion of commanders' authority, especially in the higher echelon, disrupting the chain of command. Conducting one-on-one communications may have solved urgent issues, but it also kept command posts in the dark, as they did not have the ability to monitor communications and reports, or assess and update situational pictures. This lack of access became highly acute in emergency situations like medical evacuations, in which split-second multi-access communication coordination was vital in saving lives. |
Ракету С-802 он "Силкуорм" называет, как раз так писали все газеты сразу после удара по "Ханит", в более поздних публикациях обычно было уже просто "С-802".
Posted: Thu Jul 26, 2007 8:33 pm—
У них семейная фирма. Положиться им больше не на кого - "всего мужиков-то - отец мой, да я". Популяризаторы от сохи. А ещё они любят и могут переводить. Например с русского. Недавно у них Россия собиралась вводить в строй в будущем авианосцы Новороссийск, Киев, Минск и Баку. Весёлые люди. Но у них уже имя, а потому народ хавает.
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