У нас, оказывается, есть флот

Я тут посмотрел на американские передачи союзным государствам ( http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/world.html ), так похоже Греки получат 2 этих Спруанса вообще бесплатно ( http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/notif_db.php?regionin=%&ctryin=%&descin=spruance&date1in=1992&date2in=2003&typein=% ). Турки получили пару бесплатных Перри и Кноксов ....может, надо просто попросить? :)
Это крупные корабли, чьё содержание стоит дорого. Зачем они нам?
Олег, авианосцы, атомные крейсера или ликнкоры типа "Мисури" с командой в 5000 человек нам действительно не нужно, но нащет эсминцев... ИМХО хотя бы один должен быть и причем неплохого класса, Должен быть флагман ну и конечно теоретически его можно выставить в cлучае войны против теоретических крупных кораблей противника... не посылая на каждый из них половину ракетных кaтeров...
В конце концов были ведь у нас миноносцы типа "Эйлат" ...
Не так уж и дорого - Кидды стоят приблизительно $25,000,000 в год оперировать. Ну так эти новенкие тоже не бесплатно будут. Зато Кидд очень балансированный дизайн, с возможностями против воздушных ( 2 ПУ Стандард Миссил), подводных (2 ПУ Мк 46 торпед) и наземных (2 четырехкратных ПУ Гарпун, 2 5 дюймовых орудия). Спруанс немножко менее пригоден - они всетаки изначально противолодочные корабли (он в эксплуатации стоит $35 млн). Я кстати думаю что цена в себе включает зарплату моряков - с призывниками они подешевле будут.
авианосцы, атомные крейсера или ликнкоры типа "Мисури" с командой в 5000 человек нам действительно не нужно
Что за пораженческие настроения? Нужны, и еще как! Базироваться они будут в той же Индии. В целях экономии экипаж будет состоять из нелегальных китайских эмигрантов, которые готовы убить кого угодно всего за двадцатку. Низкая квалификация экипажа в данном случае не играет большой роли - из главного калибра прямой наводкой по Александрии можно стрелять неприцельно, все равно не промахнешься. Ходить они будут под либерийским флагом. Или под балимантанским. Флот Мальтийского Ордена нам уже не страшен.

Олег Грановский

Команда форума
В конце концов были ведь у нас миноносцы типа "Эйлат" ...
Были. И плохо кочили.

Кидд - полное водоизмещение почти 10,000 тонн.


Всё равно их продали Тайваню.

Нокс - полное водоизмещение за 4,000 тонн, экипаж 285 человек (как на трёх Эйлат-5).


Спрюенс - полное водоизмещение за 9,000 тонн, экипаж 382 человека


Самый новый построен 20 лет назад.

Оливер Х Пери - полное водоизмещение за 4,000 тонн, экипаж 300 человек

В связи со сложившейся в стране революционной ситуацией, а также с намечаемым строительством Средиземноморско-Красноморского и, возможно Средиземноморско-Мертвоморского каналов, предлагаю купить "Аврору". :D


Лучезарный колёс
The Navy is seeking to broadly expand its coast guard role in order to add a new dimension to Israel's strategic depth, by procuring larger strike vessels equipped with cruise missiles and advanced radars.

The package for at least two ships with an option for at least two more would cost about $500 million each, industry sources said.
Кстати об этом писалось здесь:
New horizons

We came onto the dry dock along the Kennebec River from a cross-country trip that had taken us from one PowerPoint briefing to the next, glad to feel the wind and Atlantic drizzle on our faces after days of listening to former US navy captains and squadron commanders pursuing their second careers as salesmen.

Before us, top Israeli Navy officers had quietly come out to the Bath Iron Works, a 120-year-old shipyard near Portland, Maine, to have a firsthand look at what they believe could be the birthplace of a new strategy for defending the Jewish state.

The shipyard is normally bursting with the cacophony of sheet metal being cut in a glorious spray of sparks, and welders and chippers and pipefitters bustling amid the rumbling cranes. But on this particular day in late November, the shipyard is eerily silent due to a rare power outage.

The waves of the recently dredged river can be heard lapping up against the newest AEGIS cruiser built for the US Navy secured to the wharfside. Another waits in the floating dry dock for its final paint job. It is here that the keel will be laid for a vessel which will strengthen Israel's future as it considers stretching its strategic depth to the west, to the sea.

Or at least this is what some industry officials have in mind as they consider how best to cash in on a bold initiative being considered in Israel to transform the navy from a small, but successful, coastguard into an offensive arm with large and stealthy strike vessels equipped with advanced radars and cruise missiles capable of attacking targets deep into enemy territory.

The idea being put forward is to take the existing design for the Sa'ar 5 missile boats and extend them to accommodate cruise missiles and radars, or to procure totally new and larger vessels and arm them to the teeth.

ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC doctrine has always been to take the battle to the enemy. Our defense forces strive to ensure the battleground will be outside of Israel's borders.

"In 1967 we got depth and turned into another country," says a senior IDF officer. "Since then, all members of the General Staff, no matter what the color of their uniform, live with the thought of trying to recreate the first three hours of the Six Day War."

Swift, accurate and deadly. But in today's world, preemptive strikes are becoming taboo. The concept of seizing terrain is giving way to emphasis on destroying enemy forces now that the Soviet patron is gone. Israel has learned that ground taken is difficult to give up and yet difficult to control. The buffer zones we created were slowly given back one by one. First the Sinai and then the security zone in southern Lebanon. The Golan Heights remains, for now, but the final buffer zone, the West Bank, is being fenced off and polls consistently show a majority of Israelis want to pull back from there as well.

Our enemies have seen their conventional armies are no match for the IDF, so they have developed doctrines that bypass our powerful divisions and air force and exploit our weakness - our hypersensitivity to civilian casualties caused by terrorism or by weapons of mass destruction delivered by surface-to-surface missiles or remote controlled planes.

"The sense of a lack of depth creates a feeling of strangulation and that influences our psyche. And this in return influences our strategic concepts," says a senior Naval officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity. He meant the "not one inch" approach where the line of contact with the enemy is where you stop because your backs are against the wall, or in our case, the sea.

And so, the visionaries look to our western border, to the sea into which it is said the Arabs want to throw us, and see our future line of defense.

One of the first to seriously raise this idea was Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Israel Tal, the "father of the Merkava tank" who wrote a decade ago in his book National Security: "The Air Force is extremely important and crucial but it can no longer serve as Israel's exclusive deterrent factor and strategic military element Israel must transform the sea into a part of the country's strategic depth. The designation of the Navy must change so that it is no longer an assistance branch, but a branch of strategic deterrence."

IN THE early days, the Israeli fleet was a collection of World War II castoffs. Funding went for tanks and warplanes upon which the nation, correctly, depended to defend itself against the conventional Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies. Then the navy got backing to acquire cheap patrol boats and mount on them Israeli-made, sea-to-sea versions of a land missile giving them a heavy punch that proved itself in the 1973 Yom Kippur War when it sunk 12 Arab missile boats without any losses. But this was of marginal importance.

Except for two horrific infiltrations (1975 and 197:cool: that left 42 civilians murdered, the navy has had a fairly good record of defending Israel's coast. The failure to catch a fast speedboat laden with Palestinian terrorists heading for Nitzanim beach in 1989 caused the Navy to upgrade its fleet of patrol boats, Daburs, with faster Super Dvoras.

In a more recent success, in 2002, naval radar helped locate the Palestinian arms-laden Karine-A heading toward the Gaza coast and frogmen were quickly dispatched to capture it.

For a country like Israel, where 95 percent of its military supplies come from the sea, defending the sea routes is without a doubt an existential strategic interest. The purchase of three Sa'ar 5 class missile corvettes (1,400 tons) in the mid 1990s supplemented its smaller fleets of missile boats making the Navy a formidable force to defend the coast and take on Arab navies.

The picture was completed with the delivery of three tailor-made, Dolphin-class submarines from Germany starting in 1999. With a range of 4,500 kilometers, they are Israel's "second strike" platforms, which, according to foreign reports, are equipped with cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. But as the poor relation in the IDF, the deal was originally canceled, only to go through when Germany agreed to donate all but the price of half of one sub to Israel.

As far as many in the defense establishment are concerned, this is an adequate navy for a country the size of Israel. The money has traditionally been spent more and more on the Air Force and Intelligence. The most recent case is the whopping $4.5 billion spent on 102 long-range F-16Is, the first of which rolled off the production line last month at the Lockheed Martin plant in Texas.

SENIOR NAVAL officers, starting with OC Navy Adm. Yedidiya Ya'ari, believe the Navy should have a more participatory role in future battles. They and some government figures warn that the country is merely "one big and exposed aircraft carrier" whose 11 military air fields and numerous army bases are vulnerable to attack and therefore paralysis.

"Israel's air superiority only exists in the air," says Yuval Steinitz, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and strong supporter of investing in the Navy.

Steinitz envisions a scenario of major conflict with squads of Palestinian guerrillas attacking air bases, reserve call-up centers and state infrastructure. The increasing urbanization combined with the proliferation of surface-to-surface rockets capable of striking the static air bases is Israel's Achilles' heel. Israel's vaunted qualitative gap suddenly disappears.

"Arabs can use relatively primitive means to confound IAF operations, like Scuds and rockets Hizbullah has, and long-range artillery and guerrilla commando units attacking near air ports with shoulder-fired missiles," Steinitz says.

"The air force can't be the only pillar upon which rests the security of the state. We have to have an alternative," Steinitz says. "This alternative can be found at sea.

"We have to turn the eastern Mediterranean Sea into an Israeli sea. Our platforms have to move beyond guarding the coast and sea routes to attack. And thus we will be able to extend our strategic depth," he adds.

"If we develop a navy that will be able not only to achieve superiority at sea in the eastern Mediterranean, but also to supply concentrated, accurate and relatively inexpensive firepower from the sea - not to the coast but into the depths of hundreds of kilometers - then the navy could take on missions like the air force such as striking troop concentrations, headquarters, air bases, missile bases, radar and infrastructures like bridges and power stations."

In the previous Knesset, Steinitz headed a sub-committee which examined the future of the Navy. In a paper released later, Steinitz sees the Navy acquiring frigates, (4,000 tons) destroyers (9,200 tons) and cruisers (12,000 tons) equipped with cruise missiles with a range of some 2,000 kilometers, assault drones and marine artillery, including one being developed now which is capable of firing satellite-guided 155 mm rounds between 75 and 120 kilometers, putting the Golan and Damascus well within reach.
The idea is to relieve the air force of some of its classic missions based, somewhat, on the American model.

During the Gulf War, US naval ships were positioned in the Red Sea to unleash missiles at Iraq. Israel's potential enemies are now on the periphery.

Naval experts say that ships today are more survivable than in the past, particularly when one side holds a technological edge.

"You can surely sink a ship and the smaller they are the more vulnerable they are. But ships are mobile and this gives them an edge over any base on land which is fixed geographically," says Col. Mackubin Owens, professor of strategy and force-planning at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. "Also, corvettes are very fast and that can minimize their vulnerability."

In principle the idea makes sense, says Prof. Owens. "Israel is not a major naval power, but Israel is limited in its maneuverability. It is hemmed in by its neighbors and the sea is one area that gives Israel freedom of action it might not have in other places."

Steinitz believes Israel could achieve "absolute naval superiority" in the eastern Mediterranean by forming a "sea-air envelope" that links radars and command and control structures. With two AEGIS corvettes, the Navy could pick up Scud missile launches from Libya and possibly link up with friendly navies (US) for an even bigger picture.

The idea has been kicked around for a number of years. In the cutthroat world of arms dealers, Lockheed Martin smelled an opportunity for a lucrative deal and Israel was a perfect client.

"Having Israel purchase your weapons systems is a great boost for selling them to other countries," said an official from the aerospace giant, which also manufactures sophisticated radar systems. "People around the world know how high you set the bar and how demanding you are, so this makes our products more attractive."

It formed a consortium called AFCON with the Bath Iron Works shipyards and the Spanish ship designers IZAR to custom design a corvette for the Israel Navy.

Competition is expected to come from a consortium made up of Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Ingalls shipyards and Elta Systems Ltd., a subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries. The original builders of the Sa'ar 5, they are believed to be proposing a stretched version of that ship.

THE MATTER is now beyond feasibility studies and a decision must be made in the coming months. Defense industry officials hope that contract negotiations could be sealed by the end of next year.

AFCON says they could be ready to "cut steel" already in October 2004 with the first vessel being delivered in 2009.

One of the obstacles facing this decision is the dearth of Navy veterans in public and security networks where veterans of the air force and army exist. Opposition is most pronounced from the air force, whose budget would likely be cut to pay for it. The funding will come from the $2.2 billion in annual military grants from the United States, currently used to pay mainly for warplanes.

Ironically, it comes at a time when the leading candidate for deputy chief of General Staff is the current commander of the air force, Maj.-Gen. Dan Halutz, and as the government is pressed to cut the defense budget.

Israel Tal, who was an assistant to many defense ministers, notes that in Israel the IDF has an excellent record of obeying instructions from the government. But when it comes to constructing its force structure it makes the decisions by itself and not even the leadership in the Defense Ministry has significant influence.

For all its glitter, the air force actually has a conservative tradition. It opposed satellites and entry into space. It also originally opposed the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system. so the air force is considered a formidable opponent to the corvette plan.

"Our budget in Israel has priorities. It is nice for the Navy and others to dream but I don't think it will come about," says Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Uzi Eilam, former head of IDF R&D, who represents the Defense Ministry in Paris.

Today, senior researcher at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Eilam says the policy of the defense establishment has been to give bountiful priority to the air force. The argument against cutting this is that too much has been invested to let it deteriorate and besides, the jets are extremely versatile and a key component of Israel's strategic superiority.

"I don't see the Navy able to get this pushed through," Eilam says.

Steinitz says that the strengthening of Israel's depth through a powerful navy would actually aid peace efforts, reasoning it would "make it easier" to consider territorial compromises.

Paradoxically, this could also be an incentive for political hardliners such as Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz to nix the whole idea.

Still, Steinitz, a Likud member, maintains this view coincides with the party's stance that Israel would shrink even more, give up on large swaths of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

"I don't know about the internal debate," says Prof. Owens. "But now you can use the sea for your purposes. That is the beauty and the irony of this. You can get pushed into the sea and still kick their asses."

Ships ahoy
The AFCON corvette being offered represents the cutting edge of naval technology. It is a 101-meter, 2,750-ton vessel with a maximum speed of 32 knots and a crew of 90. It would have a 3,500 nautical mile range.

It will be equipped with an AEGIS weapons system composed of a SPY-1F phased array radar that tracks the skies for "hundreds" of missiles and other targets from the wave tops to the exoatmosphere. It promises interoperability with other Israeli radar systems, such as the Green Pine of the Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile battery to give Israel a much larger scope.

"Having a ship 200 miles out to sea extends the battle space and gives you two or three bites of the apple. This is the advantage of a layered defense which is critical for an expected barrage (of Scuds)," says John Morse, director of the Israel programs at Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems.

He says the Israel Navy officers demanded much more out of their design than other navies. In fact, although twice the tonnage of the Navy's Sa'ar 5s, these corvettes would be the smallest ship ever equipped with an AEGIS system.

"This will have cruiser capabilities in a corvette hull," Morse says.

The AFCON vessel is designed to hold MK-41 vertical missile launchers with 32 cells capable of holding cruise missiles. It is also armed with torpedo tubes, anti-ship Harpoon missiles (16 cells) and Barak rockets (32 cells) capable of shooting down incoming anti-ship missiles. It will also have other defenses such as chaff and towed decoys. Its bow currently is designed to hold a Vulcan Phlanx Gun, but that is expected to be replaced with an unnamed system.

The ships radar, aided by a large SH-60 helicopter launched off its back heliport, as well as drones, will also help it hunt submarines, surface ships and other targets.

They are seeking to sell Israel two of these AEGIS corvettes with options to purchase a third, fourth or fifth. Industry sources say that the Navy wants four, but the Ministry of Defense will only speak of two. Estimated cost would be about $500 million each.

Morse noted that the AEGIS technology was not currently releasable to Egypt, which has the most powerful navy in the eastern Mediterranean and is based on US Navy ships. Washington also turned down a request by Taiwan for an AEGIS vessel.

Alan Doughty, head of international business at Bath Iron Works, says the Israelis modified the plans to stuff more weapons at the expense of comfort for the crew.

"This ship is Spartan and made to fight. It would actually be the most powerful corvette in the world," Doughty says, quickly adding it could nevertheless accommodate new weapons systems as they are developed over the 40 years of its life.

AFCON officials say a feasibility study showed that inserting a "plug" to house the missile launchers and added weight of the AEGIS radar would make the Sa'ar 5 unstable. While Morse said there would be a "substantial share" of offset deals for local defense industries, there was no room for a radar system developed by Elta Systems Ltd, a subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries. Which brings in the competition.

The competition is being led by General Dynamics which industry sources say is proposing a stretched version of the Sa'ar 5 built by Ingalls Shipyards in Mississippi with components from Raytheon and including the new phased array radar developed for the Navy by Elta.

Rough landing
In the summer of 1958, Lt.-Col. Uri Yarom was testing out an S-58 Sikorsky helicopter. Father of the first Israeli helicopter squadron, Yarom took the new aircraft over the Mediterranean sea.

One thing led to another and Yarom soon found himself running out of gas. Not wanting to lose the new helicopter with a sea landing, he scanned the horizons for someplace to set down. Suddenly he saw it, the flight deck of the USS Wasp CVS-18.

Down below was the huge American aircraft carrier, known among its crew as the "Mighty Stinger." President Dwight D. Eisenhower had dispatched the World War II-era vessel to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean as Marines landed in Beirut to prop up that country's independence during a civil war.

But all this didn't matter to Yarom. He needed a place to land, quickly. And with pure Israeli hutzpa he did so, setting down on the USS Wasp's flight deck. He jumped out as startled, angry and curious naval officers and crew surrounded him.

The captain demanded to know just what he was thinking landing on an American aircraft carrier?!

"Oh, I am sorry," Yarom told him. "I thought it was one of ours."

Yarom, 73 and recovering from a recent stroke, still chuckles when he recalls the true story that has become lore, too unbelievable to have really happened.

"But it did happen and the captain later sent the bill for the gas to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv so they could charge the air force," he says from his bed at his home in Naveh Magen.

"The navy may want to buy larger ships, I hope we never get an aircraft carrier," Yarom says. "That would take the whole sting out of my story."
во первых чем старее корабль тем дороже его чинить и поддерживать в нормальном состоянии
во вторых нет для них оперативной базы
в третиx где набрать экипажи в таком количестве если сейчас уже с этим огромные проблемы
а кроме того эксплуатация очень дорого обойдется если учесть что все запчасти надо будет заказывать из Штатов, а часть из них давно не производится.
Штайниц - израильский фемистокол. Я, вообще-то флот люблю, я за. Однако... В случае с фемистоклом угроза была с моря, и победа на море могла в той конкретной обстановке решить исход всей компании, что и случилось. У нас же угроза с суши. Рискну показаться консерватором, но мне все-таки кажется, что логичнее было бы развивать сухопутные войска. Не только авиацию, в которой мы особо сильно зависим от иностраных поставок. Развивать надо артиллерию - у нас есть "Солтам", танки, мины, ядерное оружие, другие полезные вещи, в которых мы более менее независимы. К тому же артиллерия, мины не так дороги как корабли, а эффект большой. Корабли-же слишком дорогие и слишком уязвимые.
Штайниц - израильский фемистокол. Я, вообще-то флот люблю, я за. Однако... В случае с фемистоклом угроза была с моря, и победа на море могла в той конкретной обстановке решить исход всей компании, что и случилось. У нас же угроза с суши. Рискну показаться консерватором, но мне все-таки кажется, что логичнее было бы развивать сухопутные войска. Не только авиацию, в которой мы особо сильно зависим от иностраных поставок. Развивать надо артиллерию - у нас есть "Солтам", танки, мины, ядерное оружие, другие полезные вещи, в которых мы более менее независимы. К тому же артиллерия, мины не так дороги как корабли, а эффект большой. Корабли-же слишком дорогие и слишком уязвимые.
Точно, он далеко мыслящий человек ведь море это там где наши арабские друзья хотят видеть Государство Израиль в конце мирного процесса.

Рискну поспорить с Гаем и сказать , что ядерное оружие ничего без способов доставки , поэтому надо как то развивать именно способ морской его доставки.


хоть как то надо реагировать на морское усиление Египта.
Рискну поспорить с Гаем и сказать , что ядерное оружие ничего без способов доставки , поэтому надо как то развивать именно способ морской его доставки.


хоть как то надо реагировать на морское усиление Египта.
Ну что ж, поспорить можно, тем более. что спор хороший, конструктивный. Я с Вами согласен по-поводу средств доставки. Так я и написал - артиллерия. Это тактическое средство доставки. Артиллерия может доставлять не только ядерное оружие, но и обычное - экономия. Стратегические средства доставки, так это ракеты, мобильные ракетные комплексы. У Израиля это есть, надо развивать, наращивать количество. Про флот я не сказал, что совсем не надо. Но достаточно ограничиться кораблями "Саар - 5" и подводными лодками. Подводные лодки должны стать главной ударной силой на море. То есть флот надо наращивать по мере увеличения НВП, а не принимать специальные программы резкого увеличения типа той, что была здесь описана выше, с эсминцами и крейсерами.
Одними SAAR 5 ограничиватся нельзя так как постоянно требуется присутствие кораблей в море которые могут быть использованы как для охраны границ в сложных метеоусловиях и как силы быстрого и дешёвого реагирования в случае внезапной угрозы.
Кроме того после потопления эсминца Eilat (в 68 году) Израиль отказался от использования кораблей с большим экипажом чтобы не иметь огромных потерь солдат высокого уровня
если в смысле как воевать с Египтом маленкими кораблями ,так практически также как и большими, поскольку ракетные катера несут примерно такое же количество ракет как и фрегаты например, правда их придется зашищать с воздуха больше чем большие корабли, так как ракетные катера не резиновые все таки.
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