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DEMOGRAPHY
Date Posted: 17-Oct-2003
POPULATION
43,791,000 (2001, World Health Organisation)
44,561,000 (SA Statistics, mid-year estimate 2001)
POPULATION DENSITY
36 per km2
POPULATION GROWTH RATE
1.7 per cent (average, 1991-2001)
AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY
49 years
Ethnic Groups
South Africa's diverse population consists of four racial groups: black, white, Asian (mainly Indian) and people of mixed descent ('coloureds'). Each group comprises a number of subgroups speaking distinct languages. In mid-2000 the racial composition of the total population was as follows:
Race group
Number (million) - Percentage
Black
33.9 - 77.5
White
4.5 - 10.4
Coloured (mixed descent)
3.8 - 8.7
Asian and other
1.5 - 3.4
Total
43.7 - 100
The black peoples are subdivided into two large clusters of ethnic groups, the Nguni and the Sotho, and two smaller clusters, the Tsonga and the Venda. All these groups speak languages belonging to the Bantu linguistic family that is widely distributed south of the equator. Although Bantu cultures have many common characteristics, there are regional deviations and the various languages spoken are not necessarily mutually intelligible.
Nguni cluster
In South Africa the Nguni cluster of Bantu peoples predominate along the east coast, in the provinces of Kwazulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape Province. The two main Nguni languages are Xhosa and Zulu. Both Xhosa and Zulu speakers are subdivided into numerous tribes and clans. They are also well represented in other parts of the country, especially in the urban areas of Gauteng and the Western Cape. The Swazi of the Mpumalanga Province is a smaller Nguni group, which predominates in neighbouring Swaziland.
Sotho cluster
The speakers of Sotho languages are distributed across the highveld, including Lesotho, and the northwestern interior, including Botswana. The three main Sotho languages are Setswana, spoken in Botswana and in the northwestern parts of South Africa; Sepedi and Ndebele, spoken in Limpopo Province (formerly Northern Province) and in Mpumalanga Province; and Sesotho, which is widely spoken in the Free State Province and in Lesotho. All four linguistic groups are ubiquitous in the urban areas of the northern provinces. The Ndebele of South Africa should not be confused with the Ndebele of Zimbabwe, who are of the Nguni cluster.
Tsonga and Venda
The Tsonga and Venda are relatively small Bantu groups inhabiting the Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces. However, the Tsonga have been heavily influenced by the Zulu. A Zulu chief, Soshangane, subjugated the Tsonga where they were living in southern Mozambique during the 19th century and his Zulu-Tsonga descendants became known as Shangaan (Soshangane's people). Many of them subsequently migrated to South Africa but the Tsonga remained a major population group in southern Mozambique. The Venda are concentrated along the Limpopo River, just south of Zimbabwe, where they originated in the distant past. Similar to the Nguni peoples, the Sotho, Tsonga and Venda are subdivided into a plethora of tribes and clans.
Whites and Coloureds
White South Africans of European origin constitute the second largest racial group, followed by the mixed-race coloured population. Most of the whites and coloureds descend from the settlers and their imported slaves who formed a community at the Cape of Good Hope from the mid-17th century. Today, the majority of whites and coloureds speak Afrikaans, a creolised version of Dutch spoken at the Cape of Good Hope settlement. British occupation of the country in the 19th century led to the immigration of English-speakers and the adoption of English as the language of business and international communication. Several other European languages are spoken at home by groups of white people, including Portuguese and Greek.
Asians
The relatively small Asian population is overwhelmingly Indian, with a Chinese minority. Indian South Africans speak mainly English, though languages such as Hindi, Gujarati, Tamil, Urdu and others are spoken within Indian communities. Whereas most other population groups are distributed over large parts of the country, the Indians are heavily concentrated in the urban areas of Kwazulu-Natal and Gauteng.
Language
South Africa has 11 official languages, more than any other country: Afrikaans, English, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siNdebele, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, isiXhosa and isiZulu. The languages spoken as home languages by the largest numbers of people are isiZulu (22 per cent), isiXhosa (18 per cent), Afrikaans (14 per cent) and English (9 per cent). English is the main domestic lingua franca and the medium of international communication.
Religion
The South African constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. More than 75 per cent of the total population is of the Christian faith and predominantly Protestant. The largest grouping of Christian churches is the African Independent Churches, comprising some 4,000 churches with a total (mainly black) membership of more than 10 million. The Roman Catholic Church has about 4 million members. Among the non-Christian faiths, Hinduism is professed by the majority of Indians and Islam by a minority of Indians and a substantial number of coloureds (mainly in Cape Town).
There is a significant number of people professing the Jewish faith (about 100,000). A relatively small number of blacks adhere to the traditional ethnic religious beliefs.
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Date Posted: 17-Oct-2003
Political and Criminal Violence
Most analysts take the view that South Africa has achieved a remarkable degree of harmony since the multiracial elections of April 1994. In addition, and despite some rhetoric to suggest the contrary, the ANC-dominated administration has pursued a pragmatic economic policy in which the Strategy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) is modelled along a market-orientated framework. Nonetheless, the government faces challenges to its moderate macroeconomic approach - mainly from the South Africa Communist Party (SACP) and the labour unions that remain unconvinced of the advantages of the GEAR strategy and the concurrent programme of privatisation.
Crime and unemployment were the two key issues in the election campaign of 1999. While the euphoria that surrounded the first multiracial election in 1994 appeared to have become mired in the ANC's inability to deliver on its promises and the prevalence of corruption within the governmental bureaucracy, the underlying loyalty to the party resulted in an ANC landslide. This perhaps lends credence to the claims of optimists that the level of violence is an interim phase peculiar to societies in transition. They also point to the relative strength of the economy and to the stabilising influence of Thabo Mbeki, who is likely to provide firm and pragmatic leadership through two presidential terms up to 2009.
What is clear and very encouraging is that in South Africa as a whole, political violence has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s. Fears that political violence would spiral out of control in KwaZulu-Natal (as almost happened in 1994-96) have not come to pass and Zulu secessionist fervour appears to be on the wane. Although some violence occurred in the run-up to the 1999 election, the election itself was generally peaceful.
However, the decline in political violence is counterbalanced by perhaps the greatest challenge facing the new administration: the soaring spiral of criminal violence, with no solution in sight. Although other violent crimes, such as murder, were reported to be decreasing by 2001, violent crime generally - especially armed robbery and assault - remains at unacceptably high levels.
Three eventualities linked to the easing of border security since the end of South Africa's enforced isolation in the early 1990s have particularly contributed to the increase in criminality and urban violence. First, there is a very close correlation between the increased levels of violent crime and the proliferation of illegal firearms. Large concentrations of illegal weapons are located in areas around Johannesburg and in KwaZulu-Natal. Many of these firearms, including thousands of AK-47s, have entered South Africa from Angola and Mozambique. A recent arms cache discovered in KwaZulu-Natal, following a tip-off by a member of the IFP, and stockpiled by the IFP before the 1994 elections, included anti-tank mines and mortar bombs. Campaigns to retrieve illegal arms have been almost totally ineffective and it seems very unlikely that the number of weapons circulating inside the country can be significantly reduced even in the long term. However, new initiatives in this regard have recently been launched by the Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula.
Second is the key question of illegal immigration and its effects on an already underperforming economy. Figures for illegal immigrants range from 3 to over 5 million and there is little doubt that many of the 'illegals', who are unable to find work, turn to crime. The flood of economic refugees - which is threatening the ANC's promises of reducing unemployment and uplifting the people - is also having wider ramifications. This is manifesting itself in a new mood of xenophobia, with local South Africans increasingly blaming outsiders for their plight and resorting to violence against foreign blacks.
Third is an unprecedented growth in regional trafficking and domestic consumption of illegal narcotics. During the apartheid era, South Africa was shielded from much of the growth in the trade and the drugs problem was limited, largely, to the use of methaqualone (Mandrax) and marijuana. Today, however, large quantities of cocaine (from Latin America, often via Angola) - and to a lesser extent heroin (from Asia, often via Mozambique) - are entering the country. Major hurdles in the country's fight against drug abuse and trafficking include long and isolated land and sea borders, a paucity of personnel and resources to combat the threat, insufficient collaboration between law enforcement agencies and, crucially, official corruption. During November 2002, a UN report found that South Africa was the regional hub for drug trafficking. It was also reported to be the main source of cannabis smuggled into the UK.
What is especially disturbing to the authorities is the development of organised gangs carrying out armed robberies, car hijackings and other criminal activities. Approximately 200 organised crime syndicates are known to be operating in the country, specialising in the illegal narcotics trade, in vehicle theft and in commercial crime (consumer fraud, tax swindles, insider trading, securities violations and so on). Syndicates frequently utilise gangs for murders, kidnappings, distributing drugs and stealing private and commercial vehicles and weapons. Taxi associations, for example, are known to pay hit squads up to R70,000 to murder rival taxi owners. Commuters are afraid to step forward as witnesses and are bribed or intimidated not to testify. Some of these gangs are made up of former self-defence units (SDUs) and ex-MK/APLA personnel who turned to crime when the security forces failed to absorb them. For instance, former members of the ANC's armed wing are known to have taken part in a series of military-style attacks against armoured cash-in-transit vehicles and banks in 1997. Frequently the same networks and channels are used to smuggle illicit drugs, guns, stolen vehicles, precious metals, ivory and rhino horn. This suggests that the activities of the various syndicates are often closely linked - for instance, vehicle theft is connected to narcotics trafficking and money laundering.
The degree to which organised criminal syndicates have been able to purchase the silence or active complicity of government officials, including those working in law-enforcement agencies such as customs and excise and the police is of great concern. One positive development, however, has been the government's efforts to implement a witness-protection programme and, more recently, also the adoption of legislation empowering the state to confiscate the assets of convicted criminals. Revised anti-corruption legislation is in the pipeline.
Despite the fact that the South African Police Service (SAPS) has expanded from around 40,000 in the early 1980s to some 132,000 (including civilian staff) today, there are still few signs that the police are able to come to grips with the situation. Indeed, some soldiers are currently deployed to assist the police in serious crime prevention and containment activities. Although the police have recently been awarded substantial salary rises, police chiefs are very worried at the drain from their ranks - especially detectives and other specialists - to private security firms. More people are now employed by the private security industry than in the police service. Suicides account for over 40 per cent of unnatural police deaths: a ratio of 200 in every 100,000, compared to 22 in the US. This high rate can be attributed to extreme stress levels, thriving crime and uncertainty about their future in the SAPS as a result of the restructuring process. Relations between the community and the police also remain a source of concern, with attacks on police officers, often to obtain their firearms, an increasing problem. As the military support to the police is phased out, as well as the rural protection system (the Commandos) - which is a reservist and volunteer system falling under the military - and replaced by an envisaged police and police reservist system, even more pressure will be placed on the police.
The government's long-awaited national crime prevention strategy document (released in May 1996) went some way to allay public concerns and foreign investor fears. Developed jointly by representatives of the safety and security, defence, intelligence and welfare ministries, the strategy is designed to align the inter-departmental fight against crime. But if the co-ordinated strategy fails to deliver, the danger is that of a self-reinforcing spiral of crime driving away capital, leading to a decline in economic activity and heightened levels of criminal activity. In 2003 South Africa scored very low (17th out of 21 African countries) in an investment survey presented to the World Economic Conference in Durban. South Africa's low score was attributed to its high crime rate, especially of organised crime and corruption.
A related threat is that of a disillusioned public increasingly taking the law into its own hands. In these scenarios, crime and its consequences provide an ideal breeding ground for political violence and instability. Although there is no evidence of widespread support for such action at present, continued affirmative action policies, government inefficiency in many areas, and high levels of crime, do contribute to creating dissatisfaction. So far this has found its most damaging expression in the relatively high levels of emigration among skilled and educated workers.
Terrorism and Vigilantism
An early development with internal security implications related or in response to the spiralling crime rate has been the emergence of small groups of radical Islamists in the Western Cape. In March 1997 a Cape Town gangster and alleged drug lord, Rashaad Staggie, was lynched by vigilantes, set on fire and then shot. The murder, which was carried out by members of the Muslim-inspired body called People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), elicited wide echoes of support throughout the country. After the event, police arrested a PAGAD leader and began to clamp down on the movement. However, the vigilantes attempted to organise nationally, broadening their scope to embrace attacks on business and government corruption, prostitution, homosexuality, abortion and pornography. There were claims that some PAGAD members linked up with Libyan and/or Iranian intelligence. Armed vigilantes have frequently taken to the streets, parading illegally with weapons and masks. Not all lynchings were carried out by organised groups, but enough have taken place to underline the public's lack of faith in the undermanned and often corrupt police. Spates of bombings, including the targeting of police stations and restaurants in the Cape Peninsula, occurred in 1998 and 1999, although, following the arrest of a number of PAGAD members, the incidents seemed to have subsided, only to erupt again in the course of 2000. Since then, the situation has been relatively peaceful.
From a different side of the political spectrum, but equally disillusioned with the post-apartheid system, during 2002, a number of far-right individuals (including some SANDF officers) were arrested for conspiring to overthrow the government. A Bill to provide for special anti-terrorism legislation was also published in August 2002. A number of motives underlying the alleged terror plots were identified, including an attempt to overthrow the government; declaring a Boer Republic in parts of South Africa (restoration of the 19th century Boer Republics); blowing up the Vaal dam and other acts of sabotage; and disruption of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in South Africa during September 2002, by causing a series of explosions using rigged cooking-gas canisters. The latter would coincide with bomb attacks on the Johannesburg International Airport, the Stock Exchange and other targets. At the end of October 2002, a series of bomb blasts destroyed railway tracks near Johannesburg, while a bombing incident also occurred at a mosque.
It has been speculated that an organisation, the so-called 'Boer Force', is involved in the alleged planning of the terror incidents, and certain individuals were also alleged to be members of a splinter group of the Israel Vision Church. It is unclear whether specific incidents such as the plan to blow up dams such as the Vaal dam, can be viewed as a potential act of sub-revolutionary terror, or whether it was intended to form part of an attempt to overthrow the government and, therefore, part of a revolutionary campaign. It does seem as if the idea was that such incidents of sabotage would spark civil war. A document outlining the plan to overthrow the government was allegedly discovered. It is said to have foreseen that right-wing groups in countries such as Chile and Germany would assist the right-wing groups in South Africa. Some individuals, currently serving prison sentences, would also be freed. Blacks and Indians would be forced to leave the Gauteng province, the Northern Cape and the Free State. Military bases would be taken over. At face value, it does not seem to follow the classic patterns of a war of attrition, but rather an emphasis on terror and sabotage and the immediate unleashing of violence (elements of the Guevara and Marighella revolutionary models) and linked to an eventual military coup. By the end of 2002, however, it seemed as if most suspects had been arrested and explosives and other weapons confiscated. The trial commenced in the Pretoria High Court in May 2003. In a separate court case, three right-wingers were found guilty of plotting to blow up the Vaal Dam and precipitate a revolution. Some indications of a revival of the 'Boer Force' have emerged, but no further incidents occurred. Alleged right-wing plots have, so far, been relatively easily uncovered and suggest that most subversive groups have been fairly easily infiltrated by the loyal security forces.
Rural Violence and Land Reform
One notable case in which political and criminal violence have overlapped since the mid-1990s has been violence directed at the white farming community, especially in the northern provinces. Between January 1997 and December 1999, 361 people were murdered in more than 2,000 attacks on farms and smallholdings in South Africa. Although robbery appears to be the prime motive, political motivations underlying some of the attacks on white-owned farms have resurfaced. President Mbeki has made it clear that violent occupation of farmland, as has occurred in Zimbabwe, will not happen in South Africa.
The ANC-led government started to introduce land reform legislation in December 1994 to redress the injustices of land redistribution under apartheid. Since then land reform has consisted of three elements: land restitution, land redistribution and land tenure reform. The restitution process allows people whose properties were alienated from 1913, under apartheid legislation, to reclaim it or to apply for compensation. The claims could be lodged until mid-2002 and are handled by a commission and a Land Claims Court. Until the end of 2001 more than 63,000 claims were lodged and more than 36,000 were settled. Not all restitution claimants want to be restored to land and some have opted for financial compensation instead. By the end of 2002, R1.2 billion had been paid out in financial compensation, mainly on claims on urban land, while R431 million was spent on purchasing land to be given back to those who were forced off it under apartheid. By early 2003, some 85,000 households had benefited from the restitution process. The authorities hope to complete the process by 2005.
The land distribution programme has proceeded at a much slower pace than restitution. It aims at providing access to agricultural land to disadvantaged persons and makes grants of between R20,000 and R100,000 to prospective black farmers. Since 1999, shortcomings in the programme have been identified and policies reviewed to accelerate land redistribution. The target is to make 30 per cent of agricultural land available for resettlement over a period of 15 years. Land tenure reform, the third category of land reform, has been implemented since the late 1990s in terms of legislation aimed at the protection of farm workers and other labour tenants from arbitrary evictions by landowners, in order to ensure long-term security of tenure for farm workers and their dependants.
The government's introduction of minimum wages for farm workers in 2003 added to the problems of commercial agriculture, as many employers in this sector could not afford the increased wage costs. Although the organisations representing commercial farmers said they were optimistic that solutions to the problem would be found, there were concerns that many farm workers would be retrenched and that employers would resort to increased farm mechanisation - trends that would be contrary to what the government intended with the minimum wage measure.
HIV/AIDS
According to figures released by the Health Ministry, South Africa is suffering from one of the world's worst epidemics of HIV/AIDS, with the virus spreading rapidly and
infecting about 50,000 people a month.
The official infection rate according to UNAIDS in 2001 was 20.1 per cent of adults aged 15 to 49 years. Although this is only an average figure by Southern African standards (for example, almost half the rate of Botswana or Swaziland), the disease has already reached epidemic proportions and infects a larger number of people in South Africa than in any other country. The Mbeki government has frequently been criticised at home and abroad for its inadequate response to the pandemic, which threatens so many aspects of South African society and the economy.
The public debate on Mbeki's perception of HIV/AIDS resumed in October 2001, when it transpired that the president was not convinced that the largest portion of state funding allocated to health care should be spent on combating HIV/AIDS. Shortly afterwards the Medical Research Council released the results of research that found a steady increase in adult mortality since the 1990s. The report estimated that the disease caused about 40 per cent of deaths among people aged 15 to 49 years in 2000 and about 20 per cent of all adult deaths as well - findings that showed that AIDS was the most serious disease threatening South Africans. At the same time there was growing dissatisfaction, even in ANC circles, about the government's tardiness in allowing the anti-AIDS drug nevirapine to be used in state hospitals despite a court ruling that the drug should be made widely available to pregnant HIV-positive mothers. The national health department had placed a moratorium on use of the drug pending the outcome of research on its alleged toxicity. In February 2002, the health minister and the premier of Gauteng Province clashed publicly on the issue, following the premier's decision to make nevirapine available to patients in provincial hospitals. This step followed earlier moves by the KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape provinces to ignore the government embargo on use of the drug. In April 2002 the cabinet partially reversed its controversial anti-nevirapine policy by allowing state hospitals to make the medicine available to rape victims.
Corruption and Conspiracy Allegations
2001 opened with a public furore over the government's handling of the allegations of corruption in regard to the state's R44 billion arms purchase deal, concluded in 1999. The parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts, including the ANC majority, recommended an investigation and named the Auditor-General and three other official institutions, including Judge Heath's Special Investigation Unit (because of the success it had achieved with forensic auditing in cases of embezzlement). Although the recommendation was approved by parliament, Justice Minister Penuell Maduna wanted the Heath unit to be excluded for reasons rejected by the opposition. Government pressure on ANC members in the Standing Committee led to their backtracking and obfuscation about what was actually recommended. In the end President Mbeki backed Minister Maduna, a decision that prompted the Pan-Africanist Congress opposition party to take to court the matter of the Heath unit's exclusion. Since then ANC Chief Whip Toni Yengeni has become implicated in allegations of corruption. Of special concern is the fact that the controversy demonstrated the vulnerability of parliament as an independent organ of the state.
Yengeni was arrested in October 2001 and released on bail. He resigned as Chief Whip but retained his parliamentary seat. A warrant was also issued for the arrest of Michael Woerfel of the European Aeronautics Defence and Space company, who allegedly bribed Yengeni. Woerfel, who was not in South Africa at the time, later turned himself in and was also released on bail. Yengeni pleaded guilty, as charged, in the Commercial Crimes Court in February 2003. The long-awaited report on the inquiry by the three public institutions was released to parliament in November 2001. It cleared the government of unlawful conduct but Shabir Shaik, a relative of the Defence Department's Chief of Acquisitions, was arrested on charges relating to irregularities in the arms deal. Opposition parties later discovered that the Auditor-General had made changes to the draft report on the arms deal probe and demanded that the inquiry be re-opened.
In August 2003 Deputy President Jacob Zuma became implicated in the case against Shabir Shaik as a result of investigations by the Scorpions (police) unit of the National Prosecuting Agency (NPA). The press reported that Zuma had been living beyond his means for some years and that Shaik was his financial adviser. National Prosecutor Bulelani Ngcuka admitted in public that there was a prima facie case of corruption against Zuma but not enough evidence to prosecute successfully. Ngcuka's decision not to prosecute him left Zuma in an invidious position as it disabled the deputy president to prove his innocence in a court of law. However, it was expected that evidence to be heard in the Shaik case would throw more light on Zuma's role in the arms deal. As the deputy president does not necessarily succeed the president, the role's importance is on par with other cabinet posts. However, if the cloud of suspicion remains around Jacob Zuma, it may affect his chances of being reappointed as deputy president after the 2004 elections, which will, undoubtedly, be won by the ANC. There have therefore been allegations that Zuma's predicament has been exacerbated by those within the ruling party who would seek to gain advantage over him in the jostling to succeed Mbeki in 2009.
Back in April 2001, Safety and Security Minister Steve Tshwete had revealed in a TV interview that leading ANC members were spreading misinformation about President Mbeki, with a view to having him eventually removed as party leader and president. The naming of Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Matthews Phosa as the main culprits was received by the public with incredulity, even more so the minister's insinuation that the president's life might be in danger and that the matter was being investigated by the national police commissioner. All three accused left politics and have become prominent businessmen, although there is speculation that one or more could eventually decide to contest the presidency in 2009. The press interpreted the unsubstantiated allegations as inept handling of a normal jostling for power within the ANC rather than a lethal conspiracy. Tshwete has since apologised for the incident, which was apparently based on disinformation.
The Apartheid Era (1948-1990)
On 26 May 1948 a coalition of the Herenigde (Re-united) National Party and the Afrikaner Party was voted into office by a slender margin. Both parties represented the nationalistic interests of the white Afrikaners who formed a majority among South Africa's white minority population group whose forebears had settled all over the country since 1652. The indigenous black majority, along with minority groups such as the Indians, did not have the franchise at that stage.
Despite the unpopularity of racist attitudes in the aftermath of the Second World War, the new government embarked on essentially racist policies to entrench Afrikanerdom's political power and to ensure the continued existence of the white minority as a group. In addition to existing apartheid legislation, a plethora of new legislation provided for residential segregation, separate public and educational facilities and restrictions on non-white people's freedom of movement to discourage social contact between whites, on the one hand, and non-whites on the other. During the 1950s the constitution was amended to disenfranchise people of mixed origin in the Cape Province who had, until then, the right to vote in elections.
As a system of legalised discrimination, apartheid worked to the advantage of whites, while people other than white experienced it as unjust, leading to inequality, poverty, dislocation and lack of opportunities. Under Dr Verwoerd (prime minister from 1958 to 1966) an extra dimension to apartheid emerged, namely territorial separation and the creation of ethnic homelands (Bantustans) for the various black peoples where they would be able to own land and to exercise political and other rights. However, it soon transpired that the white taxpayers were neither able nor willing to contribute the huge amounts of money for an equitable territorial division of the country. Nevertheless, under Verwoerd's successor John Vorster (1966-197
10 ethnic homelands came into existence. During the 1970s and early 1980s, six of the homelands became self-governing, while four were granted sovereign independence, though none in the latter category achieved international recognition.
Meanwhile, since the early 1950s black opposition to the apartheid system had gathered momentum. A 'congress of the people' adopted a 'freedom charter' at Kliptown in Johannesburg, on 26 June 1955. Demanding non-racial democratic government, the Charter offered guidelines that became the ideological manifesto of the charterist movement whose main components were the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, the Natal and Transvaal Indian congresses and, in later years, also the United Democratic Front (UDF), Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and the Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU). In 1959 the racist 'Africanist' faction in the ANC, led by Robert Sobukwe, broke away from the ANC and the Charterists to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). A civil campaign of disobedience by both the Charterists and the PAC prompted the government to ban them in March 1960. Sobukwe was arrested and detained until his death in 1978. Most of the Charterist and the PAC leaders fled into exile, though both the ANC and PAC formed military wings.
Having led the armed struggle from underground, Transvaal ANC leader Nelson Mandela was arrested in 1962 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964. Prime Minister Vorster turned the country into a virtual police state in order to suppress the continuing revolt against apartheid. An undeclared war developed from 1975 as neighbouring former colonies, notably Mozambique and Zimbabwe, became independent and assisted the anti-apartheid forces. The National Party government (which had absorbed the Afrikaner Party in 1950) became militarily involved in both Namibia and Angola. On the home front a serious revolt broke out when, on 16 June 1976, thousands of youthful protesters took to the streets in Soweto, boosting the Black Consciousness Movement which was a corollary of the Pan-Africanist struggle. Its principal leader, Steve Biko, died the following year while under police interrogation.
The 1970s also saw the revival of Inkatha (later Inkatha Freedom Party) that became the ruling and sole party in the self-governing homeland of KwaZulu. Led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha worked within the apartheid system, though it rejected apartheid and independence for the homelands while standing for non-racial democracy, federalism and free enterprise.
By the early 1980s, many National Party supporters had come to realise that apartheid was a failure and that reform was necessary. South Africa faced worldwide opposition and had become politically isolated. Under Prime Minister P W Botha (later president), who had succeeded Vorster in 1978, a new tricameral parliament was introduced that gave Indians and people of mixed stock representation in addition to the whites who remained the majority group in parliament. This reform proved too little too late as the unrest increased to such an extent that a state of emergency was declared in July 1984. In the following years the international community, including South Africa's major trading partners, imposed wider-ranging and stricter sanctions that led to disinvestment and massive flights of capital. Many parts of the country had become ungovernable and the economy had gone into recession by the end of the 1980s.
A Negotiated Settlement (1990-1994)
Botha was forced to retire by reformist cabinet colleagues in August 1989 and was succeeded by F W de Klerk, who led the National Party (NP) to another election victory in the same year. On 2 February 1990 de Klerk announced the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela (then 72 years old) and other political prisoners, together with the lifting of all restrictions on banned political movements, including the ANC. Talks between the government and the formerly restricted parties followed and, in December 1991, a multiparty forum, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), came into being to negotiate a new constitution. In April 1992 de Klerk called a referendum to consult the white voters, of whom more than two-thirds endorsed the continuing negotiations, thereby overwhelming the rightist parties that had split from the NP since the late 1960s.
The slow progress of the reforms and the failure of the government to stop the violence in the townships led to a general strike directed by the ANC and COSATU on 16 June 1992. Further strikes were held in August after (allegedly) Inkatha members and the police collaborated in the massacre of ANC supporters at Boipatong. The ANC maintained its boycott of any further talks and seemed to be justified in doing so after the Ciskei massacre in September 1992 exhibited evidence of the involvement of the security forces. However the multiparty talks were resumed in April 1993 and final agreement was reached in November that year. The negotiating parties, including the NP government, agreed to establish a Government of National Unity (GNU) that was to consist of the strongest parties emerging from the forthcoming election. The GNU would serve a period of five years, between the country's first two non-racial elections. The negotiators also reached consensus on the entrenchment of a number of constitutional principles that were to form the basis of the new interim constitution (and all subsequent constitutions).
The long-awaited election took place from 26 to 29 April 1994, after a few months of preparations under a power-sharing Transitional Executive Council. Eight political parties participated. Despite the continuing clashes between ANC and Inkatha supporters, especially in Natal and Transvaal, 88 per cent of the electorate, now consisting of all South Africans, turned out to vote under peaceful conditions. Based on proportional representation, the election was declared as generally free and fair by the Independent Electoral Commission. The ANC emerged as the majority party, followed by the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party that qualified to join the ANC in the national unity government. The new interim constitution took effect on 27 April (subsequently declared South Africa's national day). In terms of this constitution the new parliament elected ANC President Nelson Mandela as the country's president, ANC vice-president Thabo Mbeki as first deputy president, and NP leader F W de Klerk as second deputy president. Mandela was inaugurated in Pretoria on 10 May, when de Klerk officially stepped down and brought to an end the era of white minority rule.
National Unity government (1994-1999)
Following the 1994 elections, South Africa made progress in establishing its democratic credentials which became accepted as an African role model. The country's permanent constitution was finalised by parliament that acted as a constituent assembly for this purpose. The new constitution that came into force on 4 February 1997 was largely similar to the interim constitution of 1994, except for the replacement of the senate by a National Council of Provinces. Deputy President de Klerk yielded to pressure from party supporters to leave the GNU in order to be more effective as an opposition party. The NP consequently withdrew from government in June 1996. Although the country gradually moved away from the political violence that raged in the first half of the 1990s, the crime rate soared to unacceptably high levels. There was also controversy concerning the procedures and revelations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
The TRC was established to hear evidence from both the victims and the perpetrators of misdeeds under apartheid in order to be able to consider applications for amnesty from persons who had confessed to being guilty of misdeeds in the course of their duties.
During 1997, the TRC heard hundreds of cases, including several significant and controversial cases. Among the key ones were the 1977 murder of anti-apartheid activist Steven Biko, the 1993 assassination of Chris Hani and allegations that Winnie Madikizela-Mandela had been involved in more than a dozen murders and other crimes since the late 1980s. In August, two white extremists, Janusz Walus and Clive Derby-Lewis, testified that they had shot Hani in order to throw the country into political chaos. Both men applied for amnesty. Several former NP ministers, including ex-President F W de Klerk, also appeared before the Commission. In many ways the Commission, which was intended to shed light on the crimes of the apartheid era and to grant amnesties to those who had confessed, proved to be a source of public rancour rather than reconciliation. Many members of the former NP regime, as well as the white extremists, viewed the TRC process as a witch-hunt against themselves. In October 1997, four former NP ministers, including ex-Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha, appeared before the Commission and denied that they had been involved in authorising the murders of anti-apartheid activists. Their comments were met with widespread disbelief.
On 23 January 1998 former President P W Botha appeared in court charged with contempt of the TRC. Botha, who referred to the Commission as "a circus", told journalists that he would not apologise for the apartheid years, adding that he would stand by those who had "executed lawful commands ... in our struggle against the revolutionary communist onslaught". Earlier, in November 1997, the TRC focused on allegations that Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (Nelson Mandela's former wife) had been involved in 13 murders and numerous human rights abuses from the late 1980s. Much of the evidence centred on the death of Stompie Moeketsi Seipei. The allegations did not, at first, appear to have affected Winnie Mandela's popular support but at the 16-20 December 1997 ANC 50th national conference she declined to be nominated as deputy secretary of the party. However, she did go on to win a seat on the 60-member National Executive Committee.
President Mandela stepped down as ANC president in December 1997. He was succeeded by the deputy president of the party and deputy president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. Jacob Zuma, previously ANC leader in KwaZulu-Natal, was elected unopposed as deputy president of the party. Opening parliament in February 1998, President Mandela called on all South Africans to eliminate the country's greatest challenges: crime, unemployment and poverty. Nevertheless, his tone was much more conciliatory than his December ANC congress address when he criticised whites, the press and opposition parties.
On the wider political front, other developments included Nelson Mandela's suggestion (made in December 1997) that the ANC should merge with its key, mainly black, rival, the IFP. The two parties have clashed over KwaZulu-Natal, which is controlled by Chief Buthelezi's IFP, although the physical conflict between the two sides subsided from 1996. President Clinton's March 1998 visit to South Africa was overshadowed by a Military Intelligence report claiming that black generals were plotting a coup against the government. The SANDF chief, General Georg Meiring, resigned after handing President Mandela a report suggesting that senior officers were working with dissident ANC radicals to topple the administration.
When the TRC did make its final report, it was something of a surprise to many. In particular, its accusation that the ANC had been responsible for many atrocities while acting as a militant activist force shocked many ANC supporters. Archbishop Tutu was clear in his intention that not only the whites should be blamed for the past years of violence.
South Africa's second non-racial democratic elections in June 1999 produced large swings among the voters to two of the 17 participating parties:
The ANC gained more than two-thirds majorities in seven of the nine provinces but it fell short of a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly by one seat. The party's performance was a repeat of its landslide victory in 1994 though it gained 3.8 per cent more support which translated into 14 more National Assembly seats, bringing its tally in the Assembly up to 266. Having enjoyed access to the state's resources - like all ruling parties - and pouring a fortune in state and sponsor money into its campaign, the ANC's performance was a 'tour de force'.
The Democratic Party (DP) experienced phenomenal growth and became the official opposition. The party's national support increased to 9.6 per cent, compared with 1.7 per cent in 1994, translating into 38 seats, up from seven seats previously. The DP also became the official opposition in Gauteng province and won several seats in KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape and Eastern Cape. Campaigning on a hard-nosed or macho-liberal platform the party attracted white voters in particular.
The main loser was the New National Party (NNP) - previously the official opposition - whose white supporters had become disillusioned with it and had left in droves. Many abstained from registering as voters or did not vote. The party's national support shrunk from over 20 per cent in 1994 to slightly less than seven per cent, relegating it to fourth place. However, the NNP won enough seats in the Western Cape - where it has many coloured supporters - to forge a coalition with the DP and block the ANC from governing the province. After failed attempts to accommodate the ANC in the 12-member provincial cabinet, the body eventually consisted of eight NNP and four DP members under the premiership of NNP leader Gerald Morkel.
Chief Buthelezi's IFP became the third largest party, despite losing two per cent of its national support or nine seats. In KwaZulu-Natal it remained a powerful political force by being allocated the most seats, though it lost seven seats and the marginal outright majority gained in 1994. The IFP stayed in power here by negotiating a coalition government with the ANC. It was agreed to expand the 10-member provincial cabinet two members to comprise six IFP and six ANC members under IFP premier Lionel Mtshali.
Although it did not exist in 1994, the populist United Democratic Movement (UDM) of Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer, a former NNP stalwart, did well by taking fifth place in the party line-up. Not only did it win enough votes country-wide to be allocated 14 National Assembly seats, it also became the official opposition in the Xhosa-dominated Eastern Cape.
Several small parties gained access to the National Assembly. Among those which participated in 1994 the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) emerged with more seats while the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the white Afrikaner-oriented Freedom Front (FF) lost heavily. An electoral surprise was the advent of former homeland leader Lucas Mangope's United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) which gained three National Assembly seats and won enough seats (three) in the Tswana-dominated North-West province for Mangope to become leader of the opposition.
Like previous elections, the 1999 elections generally reflected the voters' racial and ethnic affiliations, but there are signs of a striving towards multiracial and cross-ethnic party and coalition formation. Observers estimate that although the ANC now has the electoral support of up to 80 per cent of the black population, it is also supported by most Indians, a substantial minority of coloureds and a small but growing number of whites. In 1999 slightly more than 50 per cent of the white population probably voted for the DP, just under 40 per cent for the NNP and the rest for the UDM, the IFP and smaller parties such as the Freedom Front, Federal Alliance and Afrikaner Unity Movement. The NNP enjoys up to 40 per cent of the coloured population's support and that of relatively small proportions of blacks and Indians, while an estimated 20 per cent of the Indians and somewhat less coloureds voted for the DP in the recent elections.
The Mbeki Era
The first task of the reconstituted National Assembly and National Council of Provinces was to elect the country's new president. Nelson Mandela stepped down at a large gathering of local and foreign dignitaries in Pretoria, on 16 June, and Thabo Mbeki was inaugurated as South Africa's second black president. At the same time the terms of the provincial premiers, who proceeded to appoint the provincial cabinets (Executive Councils), commenced. The premiers were as follows: (...)
In KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape there was some delay in announcing the Executive Councils, owing to negotiations aimed at forming coalition governments.
President Mbeki announced his cabinet on 17 June. As a few ministers had retired and two were dropped from the cabinet there were several new appointments and extensive shuffling of portfolios. The new cabinet found general public favour though opposition parties and their supporters were disappointed that ministers, regarded by them as under-performing and unpopular, were retained. However, they were pleased that there was no change in the finance portfolio (Trevor Manuel) and in trade and industry (Alec Erwin), because it assured investors that there would be no drastic changes in the government's economic policies. In addition to the 27-member cabinet, 13 deputy ministers (not members of the cabinet) were appointed.
Although the election marked the end of the national unity government, as agreed during the pre-1994 negotiations, President Mbeki reappointed IFP leader, Chief Buthelezi, and two other IFP members to the cabinet. The reason given for this step was that it would serve to perpetuate the spirit of reconciliation, though there was also speculation that Mbeki was attempting to lure the IFP into the ANC.
During the first year of his presidency President Mbeki was criticised for spending too much time on foreign affairs instead of attending to urgent domestic issues. Both his foreign and domestic endeavours were undermined by rather eccentric statements on the link between HIV and AIDS. Eventually public opinion forced Mbeki to withdraw from the HIV/AIDS debate.
Local government elections, 2000
Slightly less than half of the electorate turned out, on 5 December 2000, for the country's second set of local government elections under the present constitution. (At the June 1999 national elections the turnout was 85-89 per cent.) Although most of the abstaining voters were ANC supporters, 62 per cent of the participating voters gave their votes to the ANC (4 per cent less than in the 1999 national polls). The Democratic Alliance (consisting of the Democratic Party and New National Party) drew 22 per cent of the votes (up from 16 per cent in 1999) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 9 per cent (virtually the same as in 1999), while only 7 per cent of the votes went to other parties and independents.
Of the 225 local councils in which absolute majorities were obtained, the ANC took 170 (including five of the country's six metropolitan councils). The Democratic Alliance obtained overall majorities in 18 councils, including the Cape Town metropole. The IFP won 36 councils, all in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal, and Bantu Holomisa's UDM captured Umtata, the main town in Transkei (Eastern Cape Province). Before the elections the country's traditional leaders (chieftains) threatened to derail the polls in their home areas because they were dissatisfied with the role assigned to them in local government. They were, however, placated by the government with a promise that their grievances would be looked into, after the elections, by an independent commission.
Realignment of parties
In 2000 Tony Leon's Democratic Party (DP) and Marthinus van Schalkwyk's New National Party (NNP) formed the Democratic Alliance (DA), which won that year's local government elections in the Cape Town metropole. However, as a result of bungling and intrigue in the Cape Town metropolitan council, presided over by the mayor, Peter Marais, DA leader Leon sought to get rid of the controversial Marais. However, he was opposed in this by deputy DA leader Van Schalkwyk, who led the NNP out of the DA in October 2001. During November it transpired that the NNP had concluded a power-sharing agreement with the ANC in terms of which the ANC and the NNP would jointly govern the Western Cape and Cape Town, while the NNP would receive posts in the national government and in provincial governments controlled by the ANC.
As a consequence, the DA premier of the Western Cape, Gerald Morkel, was replaced by Peter Marais in January 2002 and Morkel was elected mayor of Cape Town, the post evacuated by Marais. Both Marais and Morkel resigned (Morkel took temporary leave of his mayoral duties) a few months later. With the help of ANC members in the Western Cape provincial legislature NNP leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk was elected Western Cape premier in June 2002. Further changes were awaiting amendments to the existing legislation that proscribed defections from one party to another under South Africa's proportional representation system. However, in early November President Mbeki appointed two NNP members, Renier Schoeman and David Malatsi, as deputy ministers of health and of social development respectively. After being accused by van Schalkwyk of corruption, Malatsi resigned from his social development post in January 2003.
Amendments to this legislation in regard to local government were subsequently approved by parliament. However, UDM leader Bantu Holomisa succeeded in obtaining a ruling from the Cape High Court that the proposed legislation be referred to the Constitutional Court in order to ensure that the proposed changes did not clash with the constitution. After the Constitutional Court had ruled (in October 2002) that the floor-crossing legislation was legal as far as the local government level was concerned, members of local councils across the country were given 15 days to change their party membership. As a result 555 local councillors changed their party allegiances, of whom 417 (mainly former NNP members) defected from the DA, while the DA gained 17 councillors from other parties; the DA retained more than 1,000 councillors but lost several local councils and municipalities, including Cape Town. The ANC gained 51 councillors and lost 16. Several councillors became independents. Parliament passed legislation in February 2003 to give legislators at the national and provincial levels the opportunity to change from one party to another over a 15-day period from 21 March. The biggest loser in this process was the NNP, which lost at least nine national MPs to the DA and lost several of its members of the Western Cape provincial assembly. The UDM also lost seats to the ANC, which strengthened its overall political control. Overall, defectors tended to join larger parties or form new one-person parties. Five of these were formed. The ANC and the DA drew the largest number of defectors while the IFP, NNP and UDM lost altogether 21 seats.
However, in KwaZulu-Natal so many provincial councillors (MPCs) from other parties indicated that they would join the ANC once the enabling legislation made this possible, that the IFP leadership began to fear that it would lose control of the province. (The IFP won a two-seat majority against the ANC at the 1999 provincial elections.) In early January 2003 the provincial premier, Lionel Mtshali, announced that he would propose the dissolution of the legislature and call a provincial election. The national government was caught unaware because it was not possible to hold elections, as the country's electoral act had been reviewed and the new legislation was still not in place. President Mbeki averted a constitutional crisis at the last moment by assuring the IFP that provincial councillors who had already left their parties in anticipation of the floor-crossing measures (and lost their jobs as a consequence) would not be re-instated as councillors.
In the event, the ANC became the majority party in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature but the IFP managed to retain control of the provincial cabinet. The positions of the ANC and the IFP were switched with the ANC controlling 35 seats (up from 32 in 1999) while the IFP had 32 seats (down from 34 previously) in the 80-member legislature. With the support of the NNP (two seats), the Minority Front (two seats), and the new provincial party of Jan Slabbert (one seat), a defector from the IFP, the ANC could muster 40 seats or half the total seats.
Owing to its alliance with the DA, the IFP had six more seats at its disposal, that is a total of 38 seats, though three short of an overall majority. This left the balance of power in the legislature with the UDM, which tends to support Inkatha, and with the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). Each of these parties had one seat, but the ACDP could swing the balance in the ANC's favour if its single legislator, Jo-Ann Downs, can be persuaded to vote with the ANC. She proved to be difficult in this respect when she thwarted an attempt by the ANC to vote a motion of no confidence in provincial premier Lionel Mtshali shortly after the floor-crossing episode. The IFP leadership nevertheless yielded to ANC pressure by reappointing two ANC ministers, who had earlier been dismissed, to the provincial executive council (cabinet). Thus the co-operation agreement between the IFP and the ANC that was in danger of collapse was saved and Inkatha retained control of the provincial cabinet. .
Shortly after this the IFP began to reconsider its alliance with the ANC, both at the national and KwaZulu-Natal provincial level, probably because the IFP leadership wanted to explore the options for alliances with other parties, notably the DA, well in advance of the August 2004 national and provincial elections. IFP leader Buthelezi said in the National Assembly that he was tired of being undermined in his ministerial duties by ANC leaders who failed to accord him the respect due to him as a cabinet minister. Subsequently, the IFP provincial conference in KwaZulu-Natal gave Premier Lionel Mtshali three months to "review the political relevance" of the IFP's coalition with the ANC in the province.
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